Electricity futures prices in an emissions constraint economy:Evidence from European power markets by Daskalakis, George et al.
1	  
	  
Electricity futures prices in an emissions constrained economy: 
Evidence from European power markets 
George Daskalakis*, Lazaros Symeonidis**, Raphael N. Markellos† 
*Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK, 
Tel.: +44 (0)1603 592309, Fax: +44 (0)1603 593343, E-mail: g.daskalakis@uea.ac.uk 
(Corresponding author) 
**Stirling Management School, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, UK, 
Tel.: +44 (0)1786 466 417, Fax: +44 (0)1786 467 308, E-mail: lazaros.symeonidis@stir.ac.uk 
†Norwich Business School, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK, 
Tel.: +44 (0)1603 597395, Fax: +44 (0)1603 593343, E-mail: r.markellos@uea.ac.uk 
 
ABSTRACT. We investigate the economic factors that drive electricity risk premia in the 
European emissions constrained economy. Our analysis is undertaken for monthly baseload 
electricity futures for delivery in the Nordic, French and British power markets. We find that 
electricity risk premia are significantly related to the volatility of electricity spot prices, 
demand and revenues, and the price volatility of the carbon dioxide (CO2) futures traded 
under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). This finding has significant implications 
for the pricing of electricity futures since it highlights for the first time the role of carbon 
market uncertainties as a main determinant of the relationship between spot and futures 
electricity prices in Europe. Our results also suggest that for the electricity markets under 
scrutiny futures prices are determined rationally by risk-averse economic agents. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A large number of countries worldwide, including many parts of the US, Europe and 
Australia, have liberalized their wholesale electricity sector over the last 20 years.1 In such a 
setting, electricity futures markets serve a variety of key functions and thus their role is 
central. On the one hand, they facilitate hedging, speculation and arbitrage, increase liquidity 
and consequently improve price discovery and market efficiency (see, e.g., Sioshansi, 2002; 
Deng and Oren, 2006). On the other hand, they allow electricity producers and consumers, 
such as distributors and retailers, to reach better planning, operation and investment decisions 
(see, for example, Botterud et al., 2010; Furió and Meneu, 2010). Indirectly, they also provide 
useful insights for policy makers (e.g., Borenstein et al., 2002; Bunn and Gianfreda, 2010). 
Our purpose in this paper is to examine the pricing of electricity futures in the European 
emissions constrained economy. This is still a highly controversial issue despite its 
importance and the widespread use of futures with underlying physical electricity for more 
than a decade now. The reason is that electricity cannot be economically stored in large 
amounts. As a result, the usual cost-of-carry model of Kaldor (1939), Working (1948) and 
Telser (1958) for relating spot and futures commodity prices is not applicable in the case of 
electricity (see, e.g., Pilipović, 1998; Vehviläinen, 2002; Eydeland and Wolyniec, 2003; 
Geman, 2005). 
The usual approach followed in the electricity pricing literature is to derive futures prices 
on the basis of an empirically consistent continuous-time process of spot prices (e.g., Lucia 
and Schwartz, 2002; Bierbrauer et al., 2007; Wilkens and Wimschulte, 2007; Nomikos and 
Soldatos, 2008). This method however entails two significant complications: First, electricity 
spot prices exhibit a highly complex and idiosyncratic behaviour that is characterized by high 
levels of volatility, strong mean-reversion, periodicities at various time frames and spikes 
(see, e.g., Knittel and Roberts, 2005; Geman and Roncoroni, 2006). Therefore, the stochastic 
differential equation that accurately describes them is also complex and does not lead to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For a discussion on electricity market reform trends and policies adopted in different parts of the 
world see, among others, Mork (2001), Xu (2004) and Sioshansi and Pfaffenberger (2006). 
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closed-form solutions (e.g., Burger et al., 2004). Second, accurate pricing of electricity futures 
requires a far from straightforward estimation of the market price of electricity spot price risk 
(e.g., Pirrong and Jermakyan, 2008; Weron, 2008). 
We avoid these intricacies by concentrating on the determinants of electricity futures 
prices. Our objective in particular is to study the economic factors that give rise to risk premia 
in electricity futures prices. In this approach, traced back to the classical hedging-pressure 
literature (Keynes, 1930; Hicks, 1939 and Cootner, 1960, among others), commodity futures 
prices are considered to consist of two parts: the expected spot price of the underlying at the 
futures contract maturity and a positive risk premium (see, for example, Breeden, 1980; 
Hazuka, 1984). This premium reflects the compensation that risk-averse market participants, 
the hedgers, are willing to pay to less risk-averse investors, the speculators, in order to 
eliminate their spot price risk (e.g., French, 1986; Fama and French, 1987). The focus is then 
to understand the behaviour of the risk premium and most important to uncover its driving 
factors. 
Along this direction, we examine the ability of four economic measures of risk in 
explaining risk premia in the case of 68 monthly baseload electricity futures for delivery in 
the Nordic, French and British power market, respectively (i.e. a total of 204 contracts). The 
period under consideration is from May 2005 to December 2011. The first three risk factors 
are directly related to electricity market uncertainties. These are the volatility of electricity 
spot prices, demand and revenues (i.e., the product of spot prices and demand). Their 
inclusion in our analysis is motivated by the theoretical equilibrium model for electricity day-
ahead prices of Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) and the empirical study of Longstaff and 
Wang (2004) for the day-ahead risk premia in the Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland (PJM) 
market in the US. The fourth risk factor is the price volatility of the carbon futures traded 
under the EU ETS (see Daskalakis et al., 2011, inter-alia, for a description of the scheme). 
We justify this on the basis of the carbon risk that electricity producers face in the European 
emissions constrained economy. 
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This allows us to make contributions in at least three different directions: First, we 
extend the electricity futures pricing and risk management literature (e.g., Benth et al., 2008; 
Pirrong and Jermakyan, 2008; Redl et al., 2009; Botterud et al., 2010). Our results indicate 
that electricity risk premia for the futures contracts under scrutiny are significantly related to 
the four risk factors considered. This finding is robust under different specifications for the 
test regressions and also when the estimations are performed across markets. Moreover, by 
analysing the hedging behaviour of electricity producers and consumers along the lines of 
Benth et al.’s (2008) model we are able to provide an intuitive understanding for the direction 
of the established relationships. In this manner, we empirically identify the main economic 
drivers of futures electricity risk premia, explain on a theoretical setting the way in which 
these factors impact electricity risk premia, and consequently enhance our understanding of 
the relationship between spot and futures electricity prices in Europe. These insights are of 
fundamental importance for pricing and hedging relevant derivative instruments under the 
risk premium approach. 
Second, we shed further light on the interrelations between the EU ETS and the 
European deregulated wholesale electricity markets (e.g., Linares et al., 2006; Mansanet-
Bataller et al., 2007; Fezzi and Bunn, 2009; Kirat and Ahamada, 2011). We find that carbon 
market uncertainties are a main driver of electricity risk premia in Europe, even after 
controlling for the potential effect of the price volatility of the primary fuels used for power 
generation (coal, natural gas and oil). For example, ranking the four risk factors based on the 
number of statistically significant coefficients obtained reveals that carbon risk is the most 
important driver of electricity risk premia, followed by electricity spot price risk, electricity 
revenue risk and electricity demand risk, respectively. Moreover, the inclusion of the carbon 
risk factor in the test equation increases considerably the explanatory ability of our model. 
Most important, we observe a consistent inverse association between electricity risk premia 
and the carbon risk factor. This implies that power producers provide consumers with a 
carbon related premium (in the form of a discount in electricity futures prices) for motivating 
them to buy electricity through the futures market. In turn, this finding highlights a previously 
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unidentified role of electricity futures markets in Europe: they provide a platform for power 
producers to manage their carbon risk. 
Third, we contribute to the literature that studies electricity markets and their operation 
(e.g., Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002; Anderson and Hu, 2008; Furió and Meneu, 2010; 
Lucia and Torró, 2011). Since electricity risk premia respond to economic measures of risk, 
we can infer that the prices of Nordic, French and British electricity futures are the result of a 
rational price generating process.2 
The literature investigating electricity risk premia is extensive (e.g., Shawky et al., 2003; 
Diko et al., 2006; Kolos and Ronn, 2008; Pietz, 2009). To the best of our knowledge 
however, Longstaff and Wang (2004) is the only study that examines the economic factors 
that give rise to electricity risk premia.3 These authors provide evidence that risk premia in the 
PJM day-ahead market are related to electricity spot price, demand and revenue uncertainty. 
We differentiate from them in two main respects: First, we concentrate on the risk premia of 
electricity futures rather than day-ahead prices. This is far from trivial since the day-ahead 
power market serves a fundamentally different role than the futures one. While the former is 
used for planning purposes and the optimal organization and operation of the electricity 
market, the latter serves as a hedging platform for market participants (e.g., Geman, 2005). 
Consequently, the economic factors that give rise to risk premia in these two types of market 
may also differ. Second, we include in our analysis the price volatility of the carbon futures as 
an additional risk factor that drives electricity risk premia in Europe. Thus, we also examine 
for the first time the potential impact of EU ETS market uncertainties on futures electricity 
risk premia and prices. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 By Nordic, French and British electricity futures we hereafter mean the contracts for delivery in the 
Nordic, French and British power market, respectively. 
3 Other researchers attempt to explain risk premia on the basis of physical and operational (market 
specific) variables. Examples include: power plant availability, wind power production, gas storage 
inventories, reservoir levels and hydroelectric capacity (e.g., Douglas and Popova, 2008; Botterud et 
al., 2010; Furió and Meneu, 2010; Lucia and Torró, 2011; Viehmann, 2011; Huisman and Kilic, 2010). 
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2. ELECTRICITY RISK PREMIA AND ECONOMIC RISK MEASURES 
The pricing relationship for an electricity futures contract under the risk premium approach is 
the following: 𝐹!,! = 𝐸! 𝑆! + 𝑅𝑃!          (1) 
In this specification, Ft,T is the price at time t of a futures contract written on physical 
electricity that matures at time T, Et(ST) is the expectation at time t for the electricity spot 
price at the futures maturity, and RPt is the risk premium at time t. Substituting the 
expectation in Equation (1) by the observed spot electricity price at the contract’s maturity, 
and re-arranging, we obtain the relationship of the so-called realized (or ex-post) risk 
premium (e.g., Weron, 2008): 𝑅𝑃! = 𝐹!,! − 𝑆!           (2) 
Our objective is to examine whether the realized risk premium, as estimated by Equation (2), 
is associated with economic risk factors related to electricity and carbon market uncertainties.  
The norm in the asset pricing and commodity pricing literature is to express such 
measures of risk in terms of second moments. Thus, for the purposes of our analysis we use 
the volatility of electricity spot prices, demand and revenues, and the price volatility of the 
carbon futures traded under the EU ETS. Spot price risk, demand risk and revenue risk are 
commonly investigated as potential drivers for risk premia in the non-storable commodity 
pricing literature (see Longstaff and Wang, 2004 for a discussion). Moreover, these have been 
identified as significant drivers for the day-ahead electricity risk premia in both a theoretical 
and empirical setting (Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002 and Longstaff and Wang, 2004, 
respectively). Here, we examine for the first time whether this is also the case for the risk 
premia observed in electricity futures prices. We include the latter in our analysis on the basis 
of the carbon risk that electricity producers face in the European emissions constrained 
economy. 
To be more specific, since 2005, when the EU ETS became operational, power producers 
in Europe are subject to an annual cap on the volume of CO2 they can emit into the 
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atmosphere. This is allotted to them in the form of carbon permits, the so-called European 
emission allowances (EUAs), with each EUA giving the right to emit one tonne of CO2. 
Should they wish to emit more, that is, produce more electricity than the amount justified by 
their emissions cap, they should turn to the EU ETS market in order to buy any lacking 
permits and avoid the penalties set. In contrast, if they abate emissions and emit less than their 
cap they can sell the surplus permits and use the proceeds to finance their operation and 
investments. 
Naturally, since the goal of the EU ETS is to reduce aggregate CO2 emission levels, 
power producers are short of permits (Ellerman and Joskow, 2008). As a result, they are 
exposed to a carbon risk associated with both the volume and price of EUAs that they will 
need in order to be environmentally compliant (see, e.g., Daskalakis et al., 2009).4 This risk 
can be substantial due to the EU ETS policy-related uncertainties that can have a dramatic 
effect on the supply, demand and consequently price of EUAs (see, also, Daskalakis and 
Markellos, 2009). For example, the emission caps set in Phase I (2005-2007) of the EU ETS 
were too generous resulting in a market crash during April/May 2006 (e.g., Alberola et al., 
2008). As a consequence, stricter caps were adopted in Phase II (2008- 2012) in order to 
ensure the achievement of the EU emission reduction targets agreed upon in the Kyoto 
protocol. 
Thus, in a rational expectations framework, and assuming risk-averse economic agents, 
one would expect for this carbon risk to be priced in the electricity futures market. Hence, our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 We should note that EUA prices represent opportunity costs that, as expected, pass-through to 
consumers (e.g., Zachmann and Von Hirschhausen, 2008; Kirat and Ahamada, 2011). However, this 
carbon cost pass-through cannot fully compensate power producers for the carbon risk they face. The 
main reason is that even though different generation technologies produce different levels of emissions, 
the carbon cost pass-through in competitive electricity prices is determined only by the emission 
intensity of the marginal production plant (see Sijm et al., 2006 for a comprehensive discussion). This 
means that the carbon cost pass-through is not representative of the actual carbon cost for each 
electricity producer. In addition, since the cost pass-through rate depends on the elasticity of demand, 
carbon costs are not always fully passed on to consumers. According to Sijm et al. (2006) for example, 
the carbon cost pass-through rate in Europe varies between 60% and 100%. 
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underlying hypothesis that we put to test here is that carbon market uncertainties represent 
one of the main economic risk factors driving electricity risk premia in Europe.5 
3. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
3.1 Data Description 
We undertake our analysis for Nordic, French and British electricity futures. This will allow 
us to study the potential effect of local market conditions on electricity risk premia and their 
driving factors. The period under consideration is from 3 May 2005 to 31 December 2011. 
This includes Phase I of the EU ETS and the first three years of Phase II. Due to liquidity 
considerations we focus on futures with baseload rather than peakload electricity as their 
underlying. Moreover, although electricity futures can have yearly, quarterly or monthly 
deliveries, we concentrate on futures with monthly deliveries only. The reason is that yearly 
futures are cascaded at maturity to corresponding positions in quarter futures, and in turn at 
expiry, to monthly futures that span the same delivery period as the quarter contract (see 
Wilkens and Wimschulte, 2007 for a similar task). 
Thus, our analysis is performed for a total of 204 baseload electricity futures (68 Nordic, 
68 French and 68 British) for delivery during the months November 2005 (NOV05 contract 
hereafter) to December 2007 (DEC07) and July 2008 (JUL08) to December 2011 (DEC11). 
Electricity futures with delivery prior to November 2005 (i.e., the contracts MAY05 to 
OCT05) are excluded from the analysis due to the limited number of price observations 
available either for the electricity futures and/or for carbon futures. We also disregard any 
contracts expiring in Phase II of the EU ETS if their trading was initiated in Phase I (i.e., the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Daskalakis and Markellos (2009) point out that due to the carbon cost pass-through, and since the 
electricity risk premium is defined as the difference between the electricity futures price and the 
expected spot electricity price at the contract’s maturity, electricity risk premia in Europe should be 
positively related to EUA prices. The authors verify this for the French, German and Nordic power 
markets and, more recently, Furió and Meneu (2010) show that this is also the case for the Spanish 
electricity market. We differentiate from these studies by focusing on EU ETS market uncertainties 
(rather than EUA prices) and their potential impact on futures electricity risk premia and prices. 
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contracts JAN08 to JUNE08). This is justified on the basis of the EUA intertemporal trading 
ban from 2007 to 2008 that the EU member states had imposed. As discussed in Daskalakis et 
al. (2011), among others, a direct consequence of this policy was that EUAs issued for 
compliance in Phase I of the EU ETS were essentially a different asset from those issued in 
Phase II. Indeed, recent empirical evidence suggests that carbon price fundamentals in Phase I 
differed from those in Phase II (Creti et al., 2012). Therefore, in order to account for these 
findings we choose to carry out our analysis separately for the two EU ETS phases. However, 
since power producers were short of EUAs in both phases (see Ellerman and Joskow, 2008), 
we expect our results to exhibit a similar qualitative picture. 
Our electricity dataset consists of daily spot and futures prices quoted in € per Megawatt 
hour (€/MWh) in the case of the Nordic and French contracts and in £/MWh for the British 
contracts. The daily load is measured in Gigawatt hours (GWh). All electricity price data are 
obtained from Bloomberg. Electricity load is obtained from Nord Pool for the Nordic market, 
the UK National Grid for the British market, and Réseau de Transport d’Electricité (RTE), the 
transmission system operator in France, for the French market. The Nordic electricity futures 
in our analysis refer to contracts traded at NASDAQ OMX Commodities. These are cash 
settled against Nord Pool’s day-ahead baseload index (system price). French and British 
electricity futures refer to physically settled contracts traded in the European Energy 
Exchange (EEX) and the Intercontinental Exchange (NYSE ICE), respectively. In the case of 
the French futures the reference price is the day-ahead baseload electricity index (Phelix 
Base) published in the European Power Exchange (EPEX). For the British futures we use as 
reference price the day-ahead baseload index from the APX Power UK (APX UK Base). We 
should note that our analysis is not sensitive to the settlement of the electricity futures (i.e., 
financial vs. physical). The reason is that financial electricity futures can be combined with 
physical delivery of electricity (and physical electricity futures with cash settlement) by 
simply placing a buy (sell) bid in the spot market that corresponds to the future’s position 
during the contract’s delivery month. The choice of the contracts is thus based solely on data 
availability and liquidity considerations. 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of baseload spot prices for Nord Pool, EPEX and APX Power 
UK during the whole period under consideration. A simple visual inspection of this figure 
reveals the three stylized facts of spot electricity prices, namely: mean reversion, periodicities 
and spikes (see, also, Geman and Roncoroni, 2006). The summary statistics of the electricity 
data presented in Tables 1-3 reveal two common features of spot power prices: the highly 
non-Gaussian and positively skewed nature of the underlying distribution and the high 
variability. The stationarity properties of electricity spot prices are examined through three 
unit root tests: the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), the Philips-Peron 
test (Philips and Peron, 1988) and the Kwiatkowski-Philips-Schmidt-Shin test (Kwiatkowski 
et al., 1992). The results, presented in Table 4, suggest that at conventional significance levels 
electricity spot and logarithmic spot prices are stationary. 
[Tables 1-4 about here] 
Figure 2 plots the aggregated electricity futures price curve for the contracts under study. 
Electricity futures prices exhibit similar patterns as spot prices thus implying a close 
relationship between the spot and the futures market. As can be inferred from Tables 1-3 
however, futures prices exhibit on average smaller variation compared to spot prices, fewer 
extreme observations (lower kurtosis), and, an empirical distribution that is closer to the 
normal (see, e.g., Lucia and Schwartz, 2002 for similar conclusions). 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 3 presents the daily electricity load in the Nordic, French and British power markets. 
As seen in this figure, demand is consistently higher (lower) during the winter (summer) 
months as a result of increased (decreased) heating needs. This pattern is also in line with the 
periodicities observed in spot electricity prices (Figure 1). 
[Figure 3 about here] 
For the purposes of our analysis we also collect daily carbon futures prices from Bloomberg. 
We use futures rather than spot EUA data as it has been shown that the price discovery of the 
carbon permits takes place in the futures market (Chevallier, 2010). For Phase I (Phase II) of 
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the EU ETS the carbon price series is constructed by rolling over from the carbon futures 
contract with December 2006 (2008) maturity traded in NYSE ICE to the one expiring in 
December 2007 (2011). Figure 4 presents the evolution of carbon futures prices and 
logarithmic returns for both phases of the EU ETS. Descriptive statistics are found in Table 5. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
The main observation from Figure 4 is the extreme carbon price variation in two different 
periods within Phase I of the EU ETS: First, during April/May 2006 when carbon permits 
plummeted to a third of their value; second, in the latter part of 2007 when the permits were 
trading at a value of only a few cents. This behaviour has been extensively discussed in the 
literature (e.g., Ellerman and Buchner, 2008; Alberola and Chevallier, 2009; Parsons et al., 
2009) and is attributed to the combined effect of the generous emission caps provided to the 
emission intensive firms in Phase I of the EU ETS and the EUA intertemporal trading ban 
imposed from 2007 to 2008. 
[Table 5 about here] 
3.2 Realized Risk Premia 
We estimate through Equation (2) the daily-realized risk premium for each electricity futures 
contract under study. In all cases we use the electricity futures price observed in the market 
today for ,t TF . The choice of TS  is based on the manner in which the actual settlement of the 
contracts takes place: for the Nordic futures we use the arithmetic average of Nord Pool’s 
system price realized during the delivery month; for both French and British futures we use 
the value of the Phelix Base index and APX UK Base index, respectively, two business days 
prior to each contract’s expiry. Summary statistics are presented in Tables 6-8. For examining 
whether the mean realized risk premia are significantly different than zero at standard levels 
we perform a simple two-sided t-test. The computed t-statistics, based on Newey and West 
(1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) covariances, indicate that this 
is the case for the majority of contracts under study (62, 61 and 60 out of 68 Nordic, 68 
French and 68 British futures, respectively). 
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[Tables 6-8 about here] 
Figure 5 plots the mean values of the realized risk premia for all futures contracts under 
scrutiny. Two interesting results are revealed from this figure. First, in contrast to other 
commodity markets electricity risk premia are not strictly positive (see, e.g., Shawky et al., 
2003; Diko et al., 2006; Hadsell and Shawky, 2006; Kolos and Ronn, 2008 for similar 
conclusions). In fact, approximately half of the statistically significant risk premia are 
negative in the case of the Nordic futures (30 out of 62) and about a third in the case of both 
the French and the British contracts (23 out of 61 and 20 out of 60, respectively). Second, risk 
premia for the futures maturing during the autumn/winter months, that is, when increased 
demand is observed (see, also, Figure 3), are generally higher than those found in the 
contracts expiring in the spring/summer months. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
This seasonality is consistent with the model of Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) according 
to which in periods of expected low power demand and demand uncertainty the forward 
electricity price is a downward biased predictor of the future spot price, and vice versa. 
Moreover, these findings are in line with the model of Benth et al. (2008) for the sign and 
pattern of electricity risk premia that is based on the temporal dimension in the relative 
appetite of electricity producers and consumers for risk diversification. To be more specific, 
these authors argue that electricity consumers are primarily interested in hedging their 
electricity spot price risk in periods of expected high power demand. In contrast, electricity 
producers are mainly interested in hedging their electricity revenue risk in periods of expected 
low power demand for better planning and investment decisions. In the former case, 
electricity consumers, as hedgers, are willing to pay a premium to power producers in order to 
motivate them in taking the short futures positions (i.e., act as speculators). In the latter case, 
electricity producers are the hedgers and hence willing to provide a discount to power 
consumers in order to motivate them in taking the long futures positions. In this manner, a 
positive, or relatively higher, risk premium is expected for electricity futures with delivery in 
periods of expected high power demand and a negative, or relatively smaller, premium when 
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the delivery of electricity concerns a period of expected low power demand (see, also, Pietz, 
2009; Botterud et al., 2010). 
3.3 Risk Factors 
Our objective is to examine whether the realized risk premia for the Nordic, French and 
British electricity futures under scrutiny are associated with four economic measures of risk: 
electricity spot price volatility, electricity demand volatility, electricity revenue volatility and 
carbon price volatility. Following Longstaff and Wang (2004), we construct these risk factors 
through a univariate AR(p)-GARCH(1,1) model: 
𝑟! = 𝑐 + 𝜑! ∙ 𝑟!!!!!!! + 𝑒!          (3) ℎ! = 𝜔 + 𝑎 ∙ 𝑒!!!! + 𝑏 ∙ ℎ!!!           4  
Equation (3) is the conditional mean equation that follows a p-order autoregressive process, 
with p selected on the basis of the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC), and Equation (4) is the 
conditional variance. Moreover, 𝑒!~𝑁 0, ℎ!  are the residuals from Equation (3), while rt 
represents daily carbon returns in the case of the carbon risk factor and daily logarithmic 
prices for the electricity market related risk factors. Finally, ht is the conditional variance for 
each of the four series. 
Constructing the carbon risk factor is straightforward: we fit the above model on carbon 
returns (with p = 1 on the basis of the SBC); the carbon risk factor is then simply the square 
root of the conditional variance obtained through Equation (4). In the case of the electricity 
market related risk factors however, we first need to address a complication. Electricity 
prices, load, and consequently revenues, exhibit seasonal behaviour (e.g., Knittel and Roberts, 
2005). Thus, we need to deseasonalize each series by regressing it against a time trend, 
dummy variables for weekly and monthly periodicities and a cosine function for the annual 
cycle (see Lucia and Schwartz, 2002 and Bierbrauer et al., 2007 for a similar task): 
𝑌! = 𝑎! + 𝜇 ∙ 𝑡 + 𝑔! ∙ 𝐷!,!!!!! + 𝑑! ∙𝑀!,!!!!!! + 𝜗 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑠 2 ∙ 𝜋 ∙ 𝑡 + 𝜏365 + 𝑌!          (5) 
14	  
	  
In Equation (5), Yt is the logarithm of electricity spot price, electricity demand and electricity 
revenue, respectively, t is a time trend, Di,t are day of week dummies, Mi,t are monthly 
dummies, a0, µ, gi, di, θ and τ are constant parameters for estimation, and Y! are the residuals 
that correspond to the deseasonalized series. We estimate Equation (5) by non-linear least 
squares with Newey and West (1987) HAC covariances. Each of the three electricity risk 
factors is then given by the square root of the conditional variance estimates obtained from 
fitting the above AR(p)-GARCH(1,1) model (given by Equations (3) and (4)) on the relevant 
deseasonalized series Y! (with p = 7 on the basis of the SBC). 
[Tables 9-11 about here] 
3.4 Estimation Results and Discussion 
We estimate separately for each electricity futures contract under scrutiny the following 
regression: 𝑅𝑃!" = 𝑐! + 𝛼! ∙ 𝜎!,! + 𝛽! ∙ 𝜎!,! + 𝛾! ∙ 𝜎!,! + 𝛿! ∙ 𝜎!,! + 𝜀!"          (6) 
In Equation (6), RPit is the realized premium of contract i on day t; σS,t, σL,t, σR,t and σC,t is the 
volatility of the electricity spot price, electricity load, electricity revenues and carbon futures 
logarithmic returns, respectively; εit is an i.i.d. error term. We use logarithmic returns of 
carbon futures since previous research (see Daskalakis et al., 2009) has found evidence of a 
unit root in price levels. Moreover, to allow for a direct comparison across the different 
coefficients, we standardize all variables prior to estimation by subtracting the mean and 
dividing with the standard deviation (see, e.g., Hong and Yogo, 2012 for a similar task). In 
this manner, the parameters express the percentage change in the risk premium for a change 
of one standard deviation in each risk factor. For example, a coefficient of 0.5 for the 
electricity spot price risk factor implies that a shock in electricity spot price volatility with a 
magnitude of one standard deviation will result in a change of 0.5 standard deviations (or 
0.5% equivalently) for the realized risk premium. The estimation of all 204 regressions is 
undertaken using ordinary least squares (OLS) with Newey and West (1987) corrected 
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standard errors. The results reported in Tables 9-11 allow us to draw four important 
conclusions: 
First, electricity risk premia respond to the economic risk factors considered. To be more 
specific, out of the 68 Nordic, 68 French and 68 British futures under consideration, the 
coefficient for the carbon risk factor is statistically significant at standard levels for 43, 45 and 
41 contracts, respectively. In the case of the electricity spot price risk factor, a statistically 
significant coefficient at standard levels is obtained for 38 Nordic futures, 41 French futures 
and 38 British futures. Moreover, demand risk (revenue risk) is a significant driver for the 
electricity risk premia in 28 (25) Nordic futures, 17 (28) French futures and 21 (26) British 
futures. For examining whether the coefficients of the risk factors, for each of the 204 
regressions, are jointly significant, we test the hypothesis αi = βi = γi = δi = 0 using a standard 
Wald test. The p-values for these tests provide evidence of a significant relationship between 
risk premia and the four risk factors for 59 Nordic futures and 58 both French and British 
contracts. Based on these findings, we can infer that Nordic, French and British electricity 
futures prices are determined by rational risk-averse economic agents.6 
Second, carbon risk is a highly significant driver of electricity risk premia for the futures 
under scrutiny. In fact, by ranking the risk factors on the basis of the number of contracts for 
which a statistically significant coefficient is obtained we find that carbon risk is the most 
important driver of electricity risk premia, followed by electricity spot price risk, electricity 
revenue risk and electricity demand risk, respectively. To further assess the importance of the 
carbon risk factor, we re-estimate Equation (6) for every contract excluding σC,t from the test 
regression. This is done in order to compare the in-sample explanatory power as measured by 
the adjusted coefficient of determination (𝑅!) for each contract with and without the carbon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In order to further ensure the robustness of our results we re-estimate all regressions using lagged 
one-period risk factors. The motivation is on the one hand, to check any in-sample predictive ability of 
the risk factors considered, and on the other hand, to deal with potential endogeneity issues. Moreover, 
we estimate contract-by-contract pooled OLS regressions, and also a system of seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR), in order to investigate whether our results are consistent across markets. In all 
cases, the obtained results (available upon request) provide a similar qualitative picture as before. 
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risk factor. As seen in the last column of Tables 9-11, in the case of the contracts where a 
statistically significant coefficient for the carbon risk factor has been obtained, there is an 
improvement in the 𝑅! of approximately 10.5% on average in the case of both the Nordic and 
British futures and 14.5% in the case of the French contracts. These results highlight for the 
first time the role of EU ETS market uncertainties as a main determinant of the relationship 
between spot and futures electricity prices in Europe.7 
Third, a comparison of our results with those of Longstaff and Wang (2004) for the day-
ahead risk premia in PJM reveals that the electricity market related risk factors driving 
electricity risk premia are the same in both the day-ahead and the futures electricity market. 
This indicates that although the day-ahead market serves a different role than the futures one 
electricity prices in both types of market are determined by the same economic fundamentals. 
Finally, the results are qualitatively similar in both EU ETS phases and consistent across 
the different, with respect to market of delivery, electricity futures considered. The former is 
to be expected since electricity producers were short of EUAs in both phases of the EU ETS. 
The latter, however, seems at first glance to be somewhat counterintuitive considering the 
different characteristics of the power markets where the delivery of the futures under study 
takes place. For example, the Nordic power market has a considerable share of hydropower in 
its energy mix, the French of nuclear power and the British of natural gas power. One might 
argue thus that carbon risk should be a less significant driving factor for electricity risk 
premia in the case of Nordic and French futures relative to the British contracts. Our results 
suggest that this is not the case. A plausible explanation can be based on the marginal pricing 
of competitive electricity prices, the cross-border interconnections and the market coupling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 We should note that carbon prices are primarily determined by the prices of the main fuels used for 
power generation, i.e., coal, natural gas and oil (e.g., Aatola et al., 2013). Thus, it might be the case that 
our carbon risk factor is simply a proxy for the variation in coal, natural gas and oil prices, respectively. 
For examining whether this is indeed the case, we re-estimate all regressions by including the volatility 
of coal prices, the volatility of natural gas prices and the volatility of oil prices in the test equation. Our 
results (available upon request) indicate that carbon price volatility is a distinct risk factor driving 
electricity risk premia and provide a similar qualitative picture as before. 
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mechanisms adopted in 2010 within Central West Europe (CWE) (Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxemburg, France and Germany) and between CWE and the Nordic region.8 
Turning our focus to the sign of the statistically significant coefficients, we find that 
electricity risk premia are in general positively related to electricity spot price volatility; 
negatively related to the volatility of both carbon prices and electricity revenues; while with 
respect to electricity demand volatility the signs are mixed. In order to understand these 
findings we need to consider in detail the hedging behaviour of the main market players along 
the lines of Benth et al.’s (2008) model. 
Consider an electricity consumer that wishes to hedge electricity spot price risk during a 
period of expected high power demand. This would require entering into a long electricity 
futures position. As a result, the electricity spot price risk would be transferred to the power 
producer that holds the corresponding short futures position. Therefore, the electricity 
producer requires a premium in order to assume this risk. In turn, this implies that the 
coefficient of the risk factor related to electricity spot price uncertainty should be positive. 
This should also be the case for the risk measure associated with electricity demand risk since 
the delivery of electricity is for a period of expected high power demand. Through the short 
electricity futures position, however, the power producer secures cash flows and hence 
removes any revenue uncertainty faced. Moreover, knowing the exact amount of electricity 
that has to be generated in the future allows the power producer to manage carbon risk. This 
is achieved by simply buying the number of carbon permits that correspond to the amount of 
electricity sold through the futures contract immediately upon entering into the short futures 
position. Consequently, the electricity producer should provide the consumer with a discount 
for eliminating electricity revenue risk and carbon risk. Hence, the coefficient related to these 
two risk factors should be negative. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Market coupling mechanisms facilitate power market integration by optimizing the allocation of 
cross-border capacities through auctions. As a result, any price differences between two or more areas 
are minimized (for more details see EPEX Spot at http://www.epexspot.com/en/market-coupling). 
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With a similar line of reasoning we can explain the signs of the coefficients for the four 
risk factors under scrutiny in the case when an electricity producer wishes to hedge revenue 
risk in periods of expected low power demand. This would require entering into a short 
electricity futures position. As a result the electricity revenue risk would be transferred to the 
power consumer that holds the corresponding long futures position. Therefore, the electricity 
consumer requires a discount in order to assume this risk. In turn, this implies that the 
coefficient of the risk measure related to electricity revenue uncertainty should be negative. 
This should also be the case for the risk measure associated with electricity demand risk since 
the delivery of electricity is for a period of expected low power demand. Through the long 
electricity futures position, however, the electricity consumer removes any electricity spot 
price uncertainty faced. Consequently, the electricity consumer should provide the producer 
with a premium for eliminating electricity spot price risk. Hence, the coefficient for the 
corresponding risk factor should be positive. Finally, as far as the coefficient of the carbon 
risk factor is concerned, the arguments presented above also hold in this case and therefore it 
should again be negative. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We investigate the pricing of electricity futures in the European emissions constrained 
economy. Our objective is to understand the relationship between spot and futures electricity 
prices. To this end, we study the economic risk factors that drive risk premia for the case of 
monthly baseload electricity futures for delivery in the Nordic, French and British power 
markets. We find that electricity risk premia respond to both electricity and carbon market 
uncertainties. On the basis of Benth et al.’s (2008) model we are also able to provide an 
intuitive understanding of the direction of the established relationships. Our analysis is thus of 
relevance and importance not only for electricity producers and consumers but also for a wide 
range of other market stakeholders, including, energy traders, speculators and funds. 
Moreover, our findings have a clear policy implication. The inverse association observed 
between electricity risk premia and the carbon risk factor suggests that power producers 
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provide electricity consumers with a discount that is proportional to carbon price volatility as 
compensation for eliminating their carbon risk. Consequently, increased volatility in the 
carbon market results in increased hedging costs for power producers. European 
environmental policy makers should therefore take actions to reduce EU ETS market 
uncertainties as these have significant but unnecessary cost implications for electricity 
producers. A way to achieve this is to provide transparent information regarding the 
emissions reductions achieved to date on a regular (e.g., yearly) basis along with preliminary 
estimates on the level of the future emissions cap. A natural extension of our work is to study 
the potential impact of the EU ETS on both the day-ahead electricity risk premia and the 
optimal hedging decisions in the electricity futures market. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of electricity prices and load in the Nordic power market 
Contract # Obs. Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
NOV05 126 37.621 37.925 44.830 33.520 2.256 0.498 3.215 
DEC05 130 39.750 39.650 46.510 34.630 2.153 0.520 3.583 
JAN06 130 41.428 41.275 46.800 37.050 1.867 0.509 4.121 
FEB06 131 41.339 41.150 48.800 37.480 1.723 1.006 5.983 
MAR06 128 39.091 37.825 49.000 34.400 3.224 1.145 3.452 
APR06 129 40.598 37.900 58.250 34.000 6.063 1.151 3.285 
MAY06 125 41.565 40.470 55.350 32.750 6.539 0.482 1.884 
JUN06 123 42.585 41.130 54.700 33.300 6.192 0.360 2.073 
JUL06 123 43.517 42.850 52.800 35.300 5.000 0.177 1.864 
AUG06 122 48.914 49.115 58.740 39.700 4.646 0.009 2.010 
SEP06 125 54.190 52.250 82.000 40.800 8.599 1.359 4.775 
OCT06 123 56.897 54.900 81.750 40.900 9.210 0.582 2.736 
NOV06 128 60.258 60.225 85.000 42.500 9.191 0.299 2.554 
DEC06 130 63.174 62.850 84.950 38.350 9.848 -0.106 2.728 
JAN07 128 63.028 65.690 86.500 37.100 12.955 -0.575 2.431 
FEB07 129 58.009 65.300 88.500 28.550 17.486 -0.343 1.719 
MAR07 126 46.180 43.075 70.000 25.850 15.283 0.149 1.444 
APR07 127 36.515 31.300 61.500 23.050 12.059 0.680 2.104 
MAY07 123 29.159 26.850 44.630 21.900 6.302 0.830 2.399 
JUN07 121 25.828 24.800 36.230 19.700 3.869 1.027 3.360 
JUL07 123 23.767 23.680 27.650 19.450 1.885 -0.158 2.270 
AUG07 123 26.239 26.000 32.000 19.550 2.562 -0.360 3.122 
SEP07 126 28.100 28.555 34.500 21.600 2.677 -0.297 3.082 
OCT07 124 30.262 30.140 36.250 25.800 2.177 0.594 3.285 
NOV07 129 39.030 37.830 52.400 34.300 3.604 1.643 5.302 
DEC07 131 45.066 43.600 55.250 39.800 3.815 0.762 2.373 
JUL08 124 38.501 39.250 50.000 27.100 6.209 0.143 1.893 
AUG08 125 46.065 44.550 61.300 33.300 7.194 0.245 1.746 
SEP08 125 53.886 56.030 68.900 39.250 8.050 -0.180 1.977 
OCT08 129 60.264 60.750 73.250 45.350 7.213 -0.265 2.190 
NOV08 130 65.532 65.800 77.500 51.750 6.095 -0.276 2.378 
DEC08 130 65.876 67.915 78.500 45.350 8.135 -0.707 2.613 
JAN09 128 63.674 68.190 80.000 39.500 11.698 -0.486 1.881 
FEB09 126 58.148 58.300 79.500 38.000 13.377 0.050 1.515 
MAR09 125 48.984 43.350 75.500 31.700 11.409 0.682 2.266 
APR09 125 41.650 39.900 61.500 29.750 7.484 0.752 2.704 
MAY09 121 34.857 34.000 49.500 26.000 4.730 1.187 4.927 
JUN09 120 33.572 34.000 39.000 25.500 2.732 -0.782 3.658 
JUL09 122 32.038 32.550 37.000 24.500 2.627 -1.018 3.655 
AUG09 124 34.722 35.300 38.900 27.500 2.495 -0.919 3.399 
SEP09 125 35.997 36.000 40.910 28.630 2.260 -0.376 2.959 
OCT09 125 35.910 36.600 41.300 28.450 3.147 -0.797 2.769 
NOV09 128 37.019 37.415 42.500 30.500 2.977 -0.330 2.051 
DEC09 130 37.505 37.550 43.700 31.630 3.036 0.223 2.307 
JAN10 127 38.336 38.380 44.650 32.750 2.752 0.076 2.256 
FEB10 126 39.864 38.525 62.000 33.500 5.267 1.832 6.406 
MAR10 125 41.852 36.500 83.950 31.000 12.141 1.894 6.329 
APR10 126 43.132 41.800 73.700 30.000 10.319 0.996 3.539 
MAY10 124 40.555 42.440 52.950 30.600 5.645 -0.177 2.180 
JUN10 124 43.050 43.890 49.500 32.930 3.784 -1.004 3.445 
JUL10 153 39.552 38.900 50.600 30.610 6.155 0.185 1.466 
AUG10 128 45.510 45.525 50.650 39.500 2.603 -0.162 2.413 
SEP10 130 47.238 46.600 52.780 41.100 2.852 0.104 2.277 
OCT10 128 48.913 49.130 53.000 43.650 2.479 -0.174 1.829 
NOV10 130 49.890 50.400 53.830 44.240 2.308 -0.531 2.269 
DEC10 131 51.013 50.150 68.330 44.650 4.331 1.845 6.806 
JAN11 130 56.185 51.375 90.770 47.600 10.387 1.699 4.751 
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Table 1 continued. 
FEB11 129 58.468 52.880 85.100 48.250 9.351 0.906 2.571 
MAR11 127 58.132 59.300 78.050 46.980 8.536 0.186 1.677 
APR11 128 58.583 60.275 74.600 46.000 7.492 -0.276 2.104 
MAY11 125 51.618 52.500 60.950 41.850 3.879 -0.579 3.470 
JUN11 124 52.137 52.000 58.500 45.500 2.774 0.046 2.264 
JUL11 153 47.178 47.890 58.100 37.900 5.843 0.076 1.594 
AUG11 123 50.829 51.500 58.630 40.700 4.466 -0.548 2.243 
SEP11 126 52.224 53.540 60.200 43.400 5.058 -0.149 1.547 
OCT11 125 50.953 49.800 60.600 32.000 6.343 -0.546 3.020 
NOV11 128 50.799 49.840 62.500 41.850 5.086 0.602 2.642 
DEC11 129 49.254 49.700 58.380 38.900 3.658 -0.324 3.976 
SPOT Phase I 664 36.995 33.512 80.415 10.240 13.141 0.673 2.942 
LOAD Phase I 664 656.240 668.964 1074.392 294.305 191.976 -0.217 2.277 
SPOT Phase II 1012 46.354 44.760 134.804 8.095 13.699 1.038 5.774 
LOAD Phase II 1012 982.916 942.122 1542.310 588.302 217.817 0.543 2.621 
Note: The period covered is from 03/05/2005 to 31/12/2011. Phase I of the EU ETS ended in December 2007. Both the trading and 
delivery of the NOV05 to DEC07 (JUL08 to DEC11) electricity futures was during Phase I (Phase II) of the EU ETS. SPOT refers to 
Nord Pool’s system price. Electricity prices are quoted in €/MWh, while load in GWh. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of electricity prices and load in the French power market 
Contract # Obs. Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
NOV05 64 51.188 42.937 51.100 53.480 49.580 0.847 0.372 
DEC05 64 52.238 49.972 50.860 67.530 49.100 3.954 2.115 
JAN06 64 59.910 57.742 57.250 81.650 50.400 9.881 0.969 
FEB06 65 65.524 57.465 63.350 85.840 50.950 9.739 0.117 
MAR06 63 65.248 51.274 66.930 76.250 51.710 6.313 -0.769 
APR06 64 55.553 43.045 55.385 60.150 49.630 2.160 -0.698 
MAY06 62 49.391 40.707 50.100 52.900 38.000 3.148 -1.797 
JUN06 62 49.342 39.799 52.990 57.200 37.130 7.382 -0.575 
JUL06 60 46.595 40.339 44.910 54.730 39.480 4.902 0.635 
AUG06 62 46.762 41.089 45.300 61.500 38.630 6.032 0.965 
SEP06 65 52.577 41.051 51.720 58.750 48.890 2.367 0.691 
OCT06 66 55.298 48.108 56.185 61.000 46.650 3.391 -0.976 
NOV06 65 69.768 58.580 70.750 76.850 59.610 5.607 -0.155 
DEC06 64 66.374 63.761 67.295 72.120 50.360 4.656 -1.634 
JAN07 127 73.060 65.735 75.250 78.500 57.670 5.168 -1.068 
FEB07 129 68.890 60.507 72.500 78.500 44.130 9.901 -1.146 
MAR07 126 55.471 50.831 57.965 69.000 28.450 11.306 -0.856 
APR07 127 38.844 38.720 42.560 47.500 27.060 6.968 -0.498 
MAY07 124 33.497 33.774 32.275 42.750 25.480 5.992 0.138 
JUN07 122 38.019 32.184 37.080 46.170 31.720 4.134 0.343 
JUL07 124 41.854 32.220 41.530 51.510 31.870 4.826 0.165 
AUG07 124 34.884 30.817 34.400 42.720 26.650 3.490 0.052 
SEP07 127 36.313 28.207 36.000 43.000 31.740 3.099 0.133 
OCT07 125 39.592 31.072 39.000 46.250 34.670 3.620 0.399 
NOV07 129 52.904 36.857 52.300 76.130 47.130 4.917 2.218 
DEC07 131 55.225 39.539 51.440 83.530 44.870 10.747 1.318 
JUL08 125 68.494 51.982 67.580 91.890 58.490 6.834 0.824 
AUG08 127 59.847 55.112 57.250 75.250 51.460 6.197 0.861 
SEP08 127 73.474 58.772 74.750 90.670 58.500 8.858 -0.024 
OCT08 130 84.405 67.942 86.845 99.870 61.870 10.702 -0.683 
NOV08 131 103.243 75.745 103.540 123.330 88.150 8.904 0.233 
DEC08 130 98.466 75.715 99.000 121.000 70.380 11.466 -0.345 
JAN09 129 103.200 77.131 108.940 129.350 65.510 18.877 -0.684 
FEB09 127 94.274 76.322 100.000 123.670 57.830 22.820 -0.195 
MAR09 126 73.182 73.284 67.315 105.450 37.850 19.758 0.286 
APR09 126 51.891 61.321 52.745 72.820 33.600 11.451 0.000 
MAY09 123 38.396 59.231 35.950 54.490 27.800 8.246 0.317 
JUN09 123 39.630 57.105 36.000 53.690 31.040 7.088 0.758 
JUL09 124 40.652 53.030 38.500 57.440 35.130 5.069 1.458 
AUG09 127 31.717 48.734 31.630 39.290 27.330 2.616 0.906 
SEP09 128 39.155 39.296 38.710 43.440 33.300 2.047 -0.155 
OCT09 67 45.760 48.238 45.350 50.570 43.250 2.021 1.004 
NOV09 65 59.425 46.569 57.540 78.800 53.250 6.044 1.615 
DEC09 75 60.157 44.798 57.930 77.750 51.250 6.324 1.190 
JAN10 64 63.390 44.894 62.625 81.500 50.230 9.441 0.417 
FEB10 62 55.303 43.578 53.440 72.000 45.660 6.971 0.766 
MAR10 59 43.993 42.113 42.630 49.450 39.500 2.775 0.214 
APR10 62 38.197 39.025 38.015 40.500 37.000 0.835 0.977 
MAY10 64 35.154 38.317 34.100 42.750 32.820 2.563 1.339 
JUN10 64 42.873 38.126 42.500 51.000 37.590 4.379 0.187 
JUL10 64 46.189 38.465 47.085 51.000 39.280 2.649 -0.995 
AUG10 66 42.734 38.374 42.845 46.120 39.250 1.599 -0.064 
SEP10 67 50.783 38.525 50.030 56.800 46.100 2.945 0.425 
OCT10 67 55.590 43.501 55.750 61.500 50.950 2.035 0.440 
NOV10 65 59.746 43.924 59.000 64.500 53.250 3.068 -0.109 
DEC10 66 56.331 44.118 56.290 61.610 52.250 2.525 0.207 
JAN11 65 59.747 45.796 59.550 63.780 55.880 2.344 -0.001 
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Table 2 continued. 
FEB11 64 55.461 46.085 55.425 60.360 51.000 2.514 0.171 
MAR11 63 52.894 46.261 53.010 58.000 49.210 1.974 0.190 
APR11 84 50.769 45.200 50.000 62.970 47.380 3.421 1.833 
MAY11 103 49.194 46.156 46.620 61.950 42.980 5.086 0.722 
JUN11 125 50.202 46.877 48.520 59.290 44.930 3.899 0.357 
JUL11 64 55.643 47.599 56.625 61.290 45.710 3.685 -0.848 
AUG11 76 48.967 47.757 50.095 55.410 35.500 4.402 -0.843 
SEP11 107 57.206 48.280 58.310 64.220 48.650 4.664 -0.279 
OCT11 84 63.285 52.452 63.250 68.350 57.780 2.601 0.132 
NOV11 77 66.219 53.666 67.250 70.910 57.500 3.535 -0.980 
DEC11 66 63.585 54.082 64.325 69.170 53.350 4.229 -0.579 
SPOT Phase I 685 48.311 42.052 314.269 9.513 24.907 3.506 27.829 
LOAD Phase I 685 55.532 51.182 78.867 36.417 9.349 0.628 2.225 
SPOT Phase II 1033 54.079 51.504 118.162 14.015 16.568 0.878 3.833 
LOAD Phase II 1033 57.958 54.341 87.284 38.070 10.545 0.673 2.432 
Note: The period covered is from 03/05/2005 to 31/12/2011. Phase I of the EU ETS ended in December 2007. Both the trading and 
delivery of the NOV05 to DEC07 (JUL08 to DEC11) electricity futures was during Phase I (Phase II) of the EU ETS. SPOT refers to 
EPEX’s Phelix Base index. Electricity prices are quoted in €/MWh, while load in GWh. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of electricity prices and load in the British power market 
Contract # Obs. Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
NOV05 206 42.937 43.640 57.070 30.560 6.406 -0.194 1.993 
DEC05 227 49.972 51.200 85.670 32.560 8.884 0.339 3.989 
JAN06 250 57.742 58.865 87.020 38.750 10.606 0.168 2.580 
FEB06 250 57.465 58.105 84.520 38.250 9.693 0.112 2.825 
MAR06 250 51.274 51.435 75.020 34.350 7.899 0.252 3.133 
APR06 250 43.045 44.100 51.000 31.260 5.291 -0.801 2.525 
MAY06 250 40.707 41.700 47.980 32.200 3.305 -0.880 3.163 
JUN06 250 39.799 40.405 45.250 30.520 2.987 -0.691 2.885 
JUL06 250 40.339 40.530 45.430 33.830 2.676 -0.277 2.183 
AUG06 250 41.089 41.695 47.230 35.980 2.617 0.034 1.980 
SEP06 250 41.051 40.720 48.100 35.920 3.059 0.185 1.774 
OCT06 250 48.108 47.885 59.400 36.030 5.212 0.075 2.320 
NOV06 250 58.580 58.800 71.650 43.230 6.772 -0.263 2.482 
DEC06 250 63.761 64.605 76.180 46.350 6.628 -0.525 2.795 
JAN07 253 65.735 69.300 78.300 39.180 10.005 -1.081 3.362 
FEB07 254 60.507 64.940 75.900 27.950 12.589 -1.088 3.199 
MAR07 253 50.831 55.970 69.560 20.100 13.676 -0.750 2.375 
APR07 253 38.720 41.900 53.500 19.500 10.563 -0.639 1.904 
MAY07 253 33.774 37.400 44.500 19.000 8.905 -0.475 1.595 
JUN07 252 32.184 34.530 44.500 20.750 7.798 -0.034 1.377 
JUL07 253 32.220 30.400 43.380 23.750 6.237 0.389 1.698 
AUG07 254 30.817 27.500 44.380 22.500 6.453 0.735 2.092 
SEP07 251 28.207 25.700 43.250 20.250 5.956 0.834 2.412 
OCT07 253 31.072 29.190 49.500 25.500 5.147 1.505 5.314 
NOV07 252 36.857 36.000 49.040 30.500 3.785 0.892 3.181 
DEC07 252 39.539 38.000 60.520 30.500 5.018 1.876 6.870 
JUL08 255 51.982 49.700 87.440 36.300 13.282 0.840 2.898 
AUG08 255 55.112 51.480 86.220 36.480 14.464 0.737 2.484 
SEP08 255 58.772 54.000 86.800 36.410 15.543 0.464 1.842 
OCT08 254 67.942 63.765 115.960 41.600 16.941 0.252 1.946 
NOV08 253 75.745 73.260 150.500 42.150 23.800 0.566 2.670 
DEC08 254 75.715 76.555 122.250 42.150 19.158 0.086 2.143 
JAN09 252 77.131 76.565 109.000 46.600 15.563 0.066 1.780 
FEB09 253 76.322 76.130 98.730 50.530 13.985 0.017 1.532 
MAR09 253 73.284 71.400 98.730 38.080 15.435 -0.081 1.853 
APR09 255 61.321 61.600 85.500 33.950 14.871 -0.220 1.803 
MAY09 253 59.231 61.100 85.500 33.910 16.687 -0.121 1.518 
JUN09 253 57.105 52.720 85.500 34.910 17.348 0.121 1.416 
JUL09 253 53.030 47.950 87.130 32.610 16.486 0.544 1.767 
AUG09 253 48.734 44.410 78.890 30.990 15.323 0.701 2.021 
SEP09 189 39.296 37.630 51.690 32.340 5.353 0.847 2.514 
OCT09 254 48.238 45.085 82.320 33.580 10.925 0.980 3.441 
NOV09 254 46.569 44.720 65.570 37.100 7.300 0.891 2.807 
DEC09 254 44.798 44.050 59.040 33.710 5.873 0.723 2.744 
JAN10 259 44.894 45.360 58.460 34.010 5.496 -0.030 2.437 
FEB10 260 43.578 43.330 54.150 34.650 5.043 -0.039 1.829 
MAR10 260 42.113 41.575 52.410 34.080 5.241 0.080 1.618 
APR10 259 39.025 38.750 45.820 33.360 3.583 0.217 1.818 
MAY10 261 38.317 37.700 45.800 33.390 3.465 0.399 2.031 
JUN10 262 38.126 37.760 45.370 33.620 3.033 0.362 2.155 
JUL10 262 38.465 38.190 44.790 33.840 2.836 0.189 1.864 
AUG10 262 38.374 38.080 44.860 33.700 2.990 0.301 2.031 
SEP10 242 38.525 38.020 45.880 33.810 3.202 0.450 2.147 
OCT10 262 43.501 43.050 51.030 38.100 3.020 0.376 2.603 
NOV10 262 43.924 44.160 50.530 38.100 2.900 0.018 2.739 
DEC10 259 44.118 44.460 51.540 38.100 3.033 0.005 2.746 
JAN11 258 45.796 46.080 54.170 38.550 3.674 -0.158 2.618 
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Table 3 continued. 
FEB11 259 46.085 46.150 54.380 38.550 3.805 -0.257 2.466 
MAR11 259 46.261 46.360 58.450 38.550 3.388 -0.456 3.459 
APR11 260 45.200 44.415 56.160 36.100 3.380 0.372 4.103 
MAY11 258 46.156 45.595 56.690 41.650 3.372 1.136 3.617 
JUN11 259 46.877 46.270 56.660 41.960 3.637 0.802 2.683 
JUL11 259 47.599 46.970 56.310 41.980 3.973 0.544 2.141 
AUG11 259 47.757 47.330 55.960 42.080 3.656 0.431 2.145 
SEP11 269 48.280 47.550 56.770 42.080 3.965 0.437 2.036 
OCT11 294 52.452 51.770 61.250 46.610 3.627 0.584 2.245 
NOV11 314 53.666 54.020 61.870 46.610 4.105 0.024 1.582 
DEC11 334 54.082 54.290 62.510 46.610 4.457 -0.024 1.431 
SPOT Phase I 683 36.539 31.890 183.320 16.840 16.837 2.776 15.906 
LOAD Phase I 683 41.126 39.693 51.332 31.670 4.416 0.534 2.121 
SPOT Phase II 1010 50.678 46.875 151.330 24.060 18.072 1.857 7.604 
LOAD Phase II 1010 39.317 38.192 50.702 28.163 4.677 0.454 2.141 
Note: The period covered is from 03/05/2005 to 31/12/2011. Phase I of the EU ETS ended in December 2007. Both the trading and 
delivery of the NOV05 to DEC07 (JUL08 to DEC11) electricity futures was during Phase I (Phase II) of the EU ETS. SPOT refers to 
APX’s UK Base index. Electricity prices are quoted in £/MWh, while load in GWh. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Unit root test results for baseload electricity spot and logarithmic spot prices 
Panel A: Spot prices 
Nordic power market 
(Nord Pool System Price) 
French power market 
(EPEX Phelix Base) 
British power market 
(APX UK Base) 
Test Null Hypothesis C TC C TC C TC 
ADF Unit Root -3.332** -3.398* -4.629*** -4.616*** -4.762*** -4.811*** 
PP Unit Root -6.217*** -6.640*** -41.366*** -41.384*** -17.891*** -18.303*** 
KPSS Stationarity 0.728* 0.141** 0.215*** 0.201*** 0.532** 0.297** 
Panel B: Log spot prices    
Test Null Hypothesis C TC C TC C TC 
ADF Unit Root -3.627*** -3.709** -4.735*** -4.709*** -4.018*** -4.081*** 
PP Unit Root -7.094*** -7.536*** -28.719*** -28.856*** -12.937*** -13.730*** 
KPSS Stationarity 0.708* 0.155** 0.276*** 0.178*** 0.497** 0.169** 
Note: The results are presented both with a constant (C) and a trend and constant (TC) in the test equation. *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. ADF refers to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey 
and Fuller, 1979), PP to the Philips-Peron test (Phillips and Peron, 1988) and KPSS to the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin test (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992). The lag structure in the ADF test is selected automatically on the basis of the SBC. For 
both PP and KPSS the bandwidth parameter is selected according to the approach suggested by Newey and West (1994). 
 
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of carbon futures prices and returns 
Contract # Obs. Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
EUA Phase I 664 12.50 15.00 30.45 0.01 10.19 0.00 1.47 
EUA Phase II 1012 15.91 14.73 29.33 6.45 4.51 0.97 3.34 
REUA Phase I 663 -0.01 0.00 1.10 -1.39 0.11 -3.11 73.44 
REUA Phase II 1011 0.00 0.00 0.11 -0.10 0.02 -0.12 5.37 
Note: The period covered is from 03/05/2005 to 31/12/2011. EUA refers to prices and REUA to logarithmic returns of a rolled-over 
EUA futures series constructed using contracts traded in NYSE ICE with December 2006 and December 2007 (2008 and 2011) 
expiries for Phase I (Phase II) of the EU ETS. Carbon futures prices are quoted in €/EUA. 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics of realized risk premia for the Nordic electricity futures 
Contract # Obs. Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
RPNOV05 126 6.572*** 6.877 13.781 2.475 2.256 0.498 3.214 
RPDEC05 130 4.833*** 4.733 11.590 -0.287 2.153 0.520 3.584 
RPJAN06 130 0.005 -0.148 5.377 -4.373 1.867 0.509 4.121 
RPFEB06 131 -2.408*** -2.597 5.053 -6.267 1.723 1.006 5.983 
RPMAR06 128 -13.752*** -15.018 -3.843 -18.443 3.224 1.145 3.452 
RPAPR06 129 -13.041*** -15.739 4.611 -19.639 6.063 1.151 3.285 
RPMAY06 125 2.384* 1.289 16.169 -6.431 6.539 0.482 1.884 
RPJUN06 123 -3.133** -4.588 8.982 -12.418 6.192 0.360 2.073 
RPJUL06 123 -6.696*** -7.363 2.587 -14.913 5.000 0.177 1.864 
RPAUG06 122 -18.204*** -18.003 -8.378 -27.418 4.646 0.009 2.010 
RPSEP06 125 -10.364*** -12.304 17.446 -23.754 8.599 1.359 4.775 
RPOCT06 123 1.883 -0.114 26.736 -14.114 9.210 0.582 2.736 
RPNOV06 128 12.806*** 12.773 37.548 -4.952 9.191 0.299 2.554 
RPDEC06 130 28.579*** 28.255 50.355 3.755 9.848 -0.106 2.728 
RPJAN07 128 34.714*** 37.376 58.186 8.786 12.955 -0.575 2.431 
RPFEB07 129 27.942*** 35.233 58.433 -1.517 17.486 -0.343 1.719 
RPMAR07 126 21.772*** 18.667 45.592 1.442 15.283 0.149 1.444 
RPAPR07 127 13.324*** 8.109 38.309 -0.141 12.059 0.680 2.104 
RPMAY07 123 28.977*** 26.850 43.750 21.900 6.173 0.831 2.386 
RPJUN07 121 1.185 0.157 11.587 -4.943 3.869 1.027 3.360 
RPJUL07 123 5.265*** 5.178 9.148 0.948 1.885 -0.158 2.270 
RPAUG07 123 8.074*** 7.835 13.835 1.385 2.562 -0.360 3.122 
RPSEP07 126 1.374*** 1.829 7.774 -5.126 2.677 -0.297 3.082 
RPOCT07 124 -6.331*** -6.453 -0.343 -10.793 2.177 0.594 3.285 
RPNOV07 129 -7.359*** -8.559 6.011 -12.089 3.604 1.643 5.302 
RPDEC07 131 -2.512*** -3.978 7.672 -7.778 3.815 0.762 2.373 
RPJUL08 124 -7.540*** -6.791 3.959 -18.941 6.209 0.143 1.893 
RPAUG08 125 -10.155*** -11.670 5.080 -22.920 7.194 0.245 1.746 
RPSEP08 125 -14.529*** -12.385 0.485 -29.165 8.050 -0.180 1.977 
RPOCT08 129 3.003*** 3.489 15.989 -11.911 7.213 -0.265 2.190 
RPNOV08 130 13.108*** 13.376 25.076 -0.674 6.095 -0.276 2.378 
RPDEC08 130 18.905*** 20.944 31.529 -1.621 8.135 -0.707 2.613 
RPJAN09 128 21.396*** 25.912 37.722 -2.778 11.698 -0.486 1.881 
RPFEB09 126 19.415*** 19.567 40.767 -0.733 13.377 0.050 1.515 
RPMAR09 125 13.279*** 7.645 39.795 -4.005 11.409 0.682 2.266 
RPAPR09 125 6.414*** 4.664 26.264 -5.486 7.484 0.752 2.704 
RPMAY09 121 0.307 -0.550 14.950 -8.550 4.730 1.187 4.927 
RPJUN09 120 -3.022*** -2.594 2.406 -11.094 2.732 -0.782 3.658 
RPJUL09 122 -1.378*** -0.866 3.584 -8.916 2.627 -1.018 3.655 
RPAUG09 124 1.381*** 1.959 5.559 -5.841 2.495 -0.919 3.399 
RPSEP09 123 -7.617*** -6.791 3.959 -18.941 6.174 0.154 1.913 
RPOCT09 125 -10.155*** -11.670 5.080 -22.920 7.194 0.245 1.746 
RPNOV09 125 -14.529*** -12.385 0.485 -29.165 8.050 -0.180 1.977 
RPDEC09 129 3.003** 3.489 15.989 -11.911 7.213 -0.265 2.190 
RPJAN10 130 13.108*** 13.376 25.076 -0.674 6.095 -0.276 2.378 
RPFEB10 130 18.905*** 20.944 31.529 -1.621 8.135 -0.707 2.613 
RPMAR10 128 21.392*** 25.912 37.722 -2.778 11.695 -0.486 1.881 
RPAPR10 126 19.416*** 19.567 40.767 -0.733 13.377 0.050 1.515 
RPMAY10 125 13.280*** 7.645 39.795 -4.005 11.409 0.682 2.266 
RPJUN10 125 6.415*** 4.664 26.264 -5.486 7.484 0.752 2.704 
RPJUL10 121 0.307 -0.550 14.950 -8.550 4.730 1.187 4.927 
RPAUG10 120 -3.022*** -2.594 2.406 -11.094 2.732 -0.782 3.658 
RPSEP10 122 -1.378*** -0.866 3.584 -8.916 2.627 -1.018 3.655 
RPOCT10 124 1.381*** 1.959 5.559 -5.841 2.495 -0.919 3.399 
RPNOV10 125 6.239*** 6.242 11.152 -1.128 2.260 -0.376 2.959 
RPDEC10 125 1.113* 1.804 6.504 -6.346 3.147 -0.797 2.769 
RPJAN11 128 -0.095 0.301 5.386 -6.614 2.977 -0.330 2.051 
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Table 6 continued. 
RPFEB11 130 -3.127*** -3.082 3.068 -9.002 3.036 0.223 2.307 
RPMAR11 126 -18.942*** -18.896 -12.586 -24.486 2.722 0.066 2.263 
RPAPR11 125 -31.392*** -32.741 -9.241 -37.741 5.286 1.835 6.386 
RPMAY11 124 -16.121*** -21.486 25.964 -26.986 12.190 1.884 6.272 
RPJUN11 125 -4.520** -4.677 26.023 -17.677 10.356 0.986 3.507 
RPJUL11 123 -5.331*** -3.458 7.042 -15.308 5.663 -0.188 2.173 
RPAUG11 123 -3.924*** -3.059 2.491 -14.079 3.780 -1.031 3.511 
RPSEP11 252 -6.948*** -7.588 4.097 -15.893 6.167 0.184 1.460 
RPOCT11 128 1.253*** 1.269 6.394 -4.756 2.603 -0.162 2.413 
RPNOV11 130 -2.608*** -3.246 2.934 -8.746 2.852 0.104 2.277 
RPDEC11 128 -1.508*** -1.292 2.578 -6.772 2.479 -0.174 1.829 
Note: The period covered is from 03/05/2005 to 31/12/2011. Phase I of the EU ETS ended in December 2007. RPNOV05 to RPDEC07 
(RPJUL08 to RPDEC11) correspond to realized risk premia of the Nordic electricity futures that were both traded and delivered during 
Phase I (Phase II) of the EU ETS. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Risk premia are 
expressed in €/MWh. 
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics of realized risk premia for the French electricity futures 
Contract # Obs. Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
RPNOV05 64 4.781*** 4.693 7.073 3.173 0.847 0.372 2.659 
RPDEC05 64 -91.073*** -92.451 -75.781 -94.211 3.954 2.115 6.796 
RPJAN06 63 -29.991*** -32.483 -7.933 -39.183 9.623 1.018 2.787 
RPFEB06 64 -17.589*** -20.036 2.879 -32.011 9.738 0.150 1.652 
RPMAR06 62 -14.817*** -13.102 -3.767 -28.307 6.352 -0.746 2.792 
RPAPR06 64 10.229*** 10.061 14.826 4.306 2.160 -0.698 4.353 
RPMAY06 61 10.690*** 11.358 14.158 -0.742 3.157 -1.843 6.338 
RPJUN06 60 6.126*** 9.666 13.871 -6.199 7.365 -0.598 1.578 
RPJUL06 58 -3.244*** -4.872 4.948 -10.302 4.859 0.658 1.942 
RPAUG06 61 -90.384*** -91.874 -75.724 -98.594 6.051 0.942 2.730 
RPSEP06 65 8.573*** 7.716 14.746 4.886 2.367 0.691 2.908 
RPOCT06 66 18.255*** 19.142 23.957 9.607 3.391 -0.976 3.353 
RPNOV06 65 21.988*** 22.970 29.070 11.830 5.607 -0.155 1.415 
RPDEC06 64 23.291*** 24.212 29.037 7.277 4.656 -1.634 6.002 
RPJAN07 127 28.077*** 30.267 33.517 12.687 5.168 -1.068 3.009 
RPFEB07 129 26.747*** 30.357 36.357 1.987 9.901 -1.146 3.148 
RPMAR07 126 29.679*** 32.173 43.208 2.658 11.306 -0.856 2.678 
RPAPR07 127 10.034*** 13.750 18.690 -1.750 6.968 -0.498 1.616 
RPMAY07 123 5.635*** 4.495 14.845 -2.425 5.997 0.123 1.324 
RPJUN07 121 -0.355 -1.308 7.762 -6.688 4.135 0.329 1.789 
RPJUL07 123 12.830** 12.659 22.459 2.819 4.837 0.151 2.090 
RPAUG07 123 10.384*** 9.903 18.203 2.133 3.499 0.039 2.693 
RPSEP07 126 2.417** 2.103 9.108 -2.152 3.111 0.135 1.759 
RPOCT07 124 -5.148*** -5.700 1.550 -10.030 3.607 0.419 1.693 
RPNOV07 129 -75.780*** -76.384 -52.554 -81.554 4.917 2.218 9.979 
RPDEC07 131 -19.347*** -23.132 8.958 -29.702 10.747 1.318 3.460 
RPJUL08 122 -17.820*** -18.797 5.503 -27.897 6.856 0.821 3.598 
RPAUG08 125 -15.749*** -18.415 -0.415 -24.205 6.220 0.839 2.556 
RPSEP08 125 -11.540*** -10.278 5.512 -26.658 8.829 -0.038 1.845 
RPOCT08 129 1.889 4.359 17.289 -20.711 10.718 -0.700 2.349 
RPNOV08 130 5.979*** 6.231 25.976 -9.204 8.877 0.225 2.163 
RPDEC08 130 17.745*** 18.279 40.279 -10.341 11.466 -0.345 3.130 
RPJAN09 128 80.967*** 86.582 106.862 43.022 18.728 -0.705 2.237 
RPFEB09 126 21.124*** 27.704 50.319 -15.521 22.798 -0.213 1.400 
RPMAR09 125 33.476*** 28.857 65.677 -1.923 19.823 0.276 1.828 
RPAPR09 125 18.828*** 19.705 39.785 0.565 11.493 0.007 1.877 
RPMAY09 121 -6.250*** -8.673 9.867 -16.823 8.250 0.323 1.545 
RPJUN09 119 7.796*** 4.630 21.860 -0.790 7.086 0.745 2.084 
RPJUL09 120 12.254*** 10.019 28.959 6.649 5.132 1.407 4.200 
RPAUG09 123 0.921* 0.833 8.493 -3.467 2.642 0.911 3.913 
RPSEP09 124 -4.493*** -4.973 -0.193 -10.333 2.063 -0.148 3.069 
RPOCT09 67 -4.601*** -5.011 0.209 -7.111 2.021 1.004 3.113 
RPNOV09 65 -3.972*** -5.857 15.403 -10.147 6.044 1.615 4.940 
RPDEC09 75 16.895*** 14.668 34.488 7.988 6.324 1.190 3.478 
RPJAN10 63 30.746*** 29.954 48.704 17.434 9.437 0.393 2.038 
RPFEB10 60 1.001 -0.950 17.610 -8.730 7.067 0.726 2.686 
RPMAR10 56 4.526*** 3.144 10.024 0.074 2.792 0.250 1.700 
RPAPR10 53 5.640*** 5.462 7.932 4.432 0.832 0.881 3.369 
RPMAY10 54 -6.531*** -7.461 0.854 -8.986 2.636 1.257 3.561 
RPJUN10 56 -0.067 0.039 7.474 -5.776 4.336 -0.022 1.388 
RPJUL10 62 -2.897*** -2.084 1.771 -9.949 2.565 -1.129 3.582 
RPAUG10 66 0.475 0.586 3.861 -3.009 1.599 -0.064 2.398 
RPSEP10 66 8.828*** 8.207 14.802 4.102 2.946 0.401 1.770 
RPOCT10 65 0.691 0.821 6.571 -3.979 2.032 0.454 3.576 
RPNOV10 63 -14.127*** -14.823 -9.323 -20.573 3.054 -0.120 2.019 
RPDEC10 64 -0.823 -0.882 4.438 -4.922 2.547 0.196 1.933 
RPJAN11 64 4.108*** 3.916 8.106 0.206 2.345 -0.032 1.811 
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Table 7 continued. 
RPFEB11 60 -2.249*** -2.498 2.702 -6.658 2.576 0.215 1.942 
RPMAR11 60 -3.398*** -3.322 1.743 -7.047 2.017 0.236 2.496 
RPAPR11 81 -4.282*** -5.077 7.903 -7.687 3.483 1.789 5.902 
RPMAY11 99 -5.272*** -7.888 7.482 -11.488 5.102 0.712 2.072 
RPJUN11 121 2.341*** 0.647 11.417 -2.943 3.932 0.344 1.599 
RPJUL11 61 8.658*** 9.688 14.358 -1.222 3.761 -0.800 3.028 
RPAUG11 76 7.564*** 8.692 14.007 -5.903 4.402 -0.843 3.299 
RPSEP11 106 2.945*** 4.031 10.006 -5.564 4.660 -0.264 1.687 
RPOCT11 83 8.326*** 8.309 13.409 2.839 2.611 0.151 2.357 
RPNOV11 76 8.911*** 9.937 13.652 0.242 3.531 -0.971 3.013 
RPDEC11 64 7.392*** 8.178 13.023 -2.797 4.237 -0.589 2.464 
Note: The period covered is from 03/05/2005 to 31/12/2011. Phase I of the EU ETS ended in December 2007. RPNOV05 to RPDEC07 
(RPJUL08 to RPDEC11) correspond to realized risk premia of the French electricity futures that were both traded and delivered during 
Phase I (Phase II) of the EU ETS. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Risk premia are 
expressed in €/MWh. 
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics of realized risk premia for the British electricity futures 
Contract # Obs. Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
RPNOV05 119 12.709*** 12.710 22.280 6.560 3.342 0.373 2.638 
RPDEC05 140 -23.325*** -25.000 7.040 -31.550 6.038 2.109 9.198 
RPJAN06 162 -5.234*** -7.040 17.870 -15.650 7.107 1.025 3.605 
RPFEB06 182 7.898*** 6.510 30.460 -3.210 6.799 1.047 3.837 
RPMAR06 202 -5.230*** -6.555 15.790 -16.330 6.147 0.955 4.060 
RPAPR06 225 6.594*** 7.110 13.370 -4.980 4.209 -0.978 3.502 
RPMAY06 242 2.830*** 3.655 9.920 -5.410 3.117 -0.871 3.325 
RPJUN06 247 6.873*** 7.530 12.380 -2.350 3.040 -0.685 2.820 
RPJUL06 247 -3.427*** -3.170 1.740 -9.860 2.755 -0.335 2.246 
RPAUG06 249 3.017*** 3.630 9.110 -2.140 2.606 -0.031 1.970 
RPSEP06 247 10.583*** 10.120 17.720 5.540 3.082 0.197 1.769 
RPOCT06 248 16.330*** 15.945 28.000 1.350 5.536 -0.065 2.583 
RPNOV06 249 29.444*** 29.850 43.110 11.530 7.114 -0.327 2.574 
RPDEC06 246 23.884*** 24.825 36.730 3.700 6.937 -0.621 3.055 
RPJAN07 246 41.111*** 44.580 53.780 14.660 9.908 -1.054 3.323 
RPFEB07 247 37.156*** 41.410 52.750 4.800 12.566 -1.081 3.196 
RPMAR07 246 32.092*** 37.350 51.090 1.630 13.668 -0.732 2.357 
RPAPR07 246 18.522*** 21.635 33.510 -0.490 10.584 -0.615 1.869 
RPMAY07 247 14.551*** 18.140 25.340 -0.160 8.910 -0.464 1.585 
RPJUN07 247 9.793*** 12.340 22.040 -1.710 7.796 -0.054 1.380 
RPJUL07 248 10.613*** 8.830 21.710 2.080 6.278 0.365 1.666 
RPAUG07 249 10.895*** 7.520 24.400 2.520 6.499 0.711 2.046 
RPSEP07 246 -16.927*** -19.480 -1.930 -24.930 5.991 0.818 2.371 
RPOCT07 248 3.487*** 1.585 21.890 -2.110 5.172 1.499 5.281 
RPNOV07 247 -15.175*** -16.010 -2.970 -21.510 3.809 0.901 3.172 
RPDEC07 247 0.702 -0.820 21.700 -8.320 5.058 1.876 6.814 
RPJUL08 120 -12.509*** -16.255 12.260 -25.480 10.959 0.667 2.222 
RPAUG08 140 -11.614*** -15.105 9.930 -27.090 12.348 0.456 1.726 
RPSEP08 160 -18.241*** -19.095 1.360 -36.940 13.215 0.071 1.363 
RPOCT08 184 -9.154*** -6.125 31.610 -32.350 13.860 0.114 2.171 
RPNOV08 204 12.760*** 11.905 80.830 -21.670 21.484 0.577 2.871 
RPDEC08 224 30.604*** 31.760 73.400 -0.850 16.995 0.173 2.205 
RPJAN09 247 33.232*** 32.780 64.780 3.780 15.449 0.070 1.739 
RPFEB09 248 22.070*** 21.945 44.290 -3.910 14.031 -0.010 1.528 
RPMAR09 248 34.110*** 32.360 59.420 -1.230 15.529 -0.102 1.844 
RPAPR09 251 27.998*** 28.220 52.120 0.570 14.953 -0.228 1.793 
RPMAY09 248 27.434*** 29.370 53.570 1.980 16.749 -0.132 1.511 
RPJUN09 247 19.106*** 15.900 47.090 -3.500 17.323 0.085 1.408 
RPJUL09 246 15.172*** 9.955 48.920 -5.600 16.558 0.506 1.723 
RPAUG09 246 18.042*** 13.525 47.950 0.050 15.435 0.668 1.965 
RPSEP09 182 3.725*** 2.110 16.190 -3.160 5.345 0.850 2.530 
RPOCT09 247 17.811*** 14.660 51.870 3.130 11.035 0.970 3.389 
RPNOV09 247 6.446*** 4.600 25.480 -2.990 7.341 0.896 2.813 
RPDEC09 247 14.715*** 14.050 29.040 3.710 5.860 0.727 2.760 
RPJAN10 251 10.564*** 10.120 24.260 -0.190 5.425 -0.036 2.420 
RPFEB10 253 7.925*** 7.680 18.540 -0.960 5.030 -0.016 1.849 
RPMAR10 251 5.508*** 4.960 15.830 -2.500 5.195 0.091 1.645 
RPAPR10 244 0.474 0.270 7.200 -5.260 3.516 0.203 1.867 
RPMAY10 244 0.150 -0.440 7.520 -4.890 3.396 0.371 2.074 
RPJUN10 248 -4.064*** -4.420 3.030 -8.720 2.983 0.302 2.158 
RPJUL10 249 -1.530*** -1.760 4.630 -6.320 2.807 0.116 1.884 
RPAUG10 249 -4.229*** -4.570 2.080 -9.080 2.956 0.243 2.036 
RPSEP10 228 -8.042*** -8.500 -0.870 -12.910 3.185 0.392 2.119 
RPOCT10 247 -0.285 -0.700 7.080 -5.850 2.994 0.345 2.622 
RPNOV10 247 -0.617 -0.450 5.820 -6.610 2.840 -0.003 2.879 
RPDEC10 243 -0.954** -0.700 6.290 -7.150 2.972 -0.021 2.894 
RPJAN11 243 -2.173*** -2.080 5.950 -9.670 3.561 -0.186 2.801 
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Table 8 continued. 
RPFEB11 242 -2.074*** -2.130 6.010 -9.820 3.656 -0.303 2.663 
RPMAR11 244 0.985** 0.930 12.980 -6.920 3.209 -0.457 3.904 
RPAPR11 251 -3.658*** -4.450 7.230 -12.830 3.289 0.526 4.187 
RPMAY11 251 -1.545*** -2.090 9.010 -6.030 3.371 1.156 3.676 
RPJUN11 252 -2.409*** -3.020 7.380 -7.320 3.637 0.805 2.690 
RPJUL11 252 0.724 0.085 9.430 -4.900 3.971 0.533 2.120 
RPAUG11 252 0.800 0.340 8.990 -4.890 3.652 0.422 2.134 
RPSEP11 263 0.988* 0.220 9.470 -5.220 3.961 0.432 2.023 
RPOCT11 287 -0.552 -1.230 8.240 -6.400 3.624 0.572 2.218 
RPNOV11 300 5.515*** 6.245 13.650 -1.610 4.132 -0.020 1.563 
RPDEC11 300 10.414*** 12.370 18.620 2.720 4.553 -0.127 1.397 
Note: The period covered is from 03/05/2005 to 31/12/2011. Phase I of the EU ETS ended in December 2007. RPNOV05 to RPDEC07 
(RPJUL08 to RPDEC11) correspond to realized risk premia of the British electricity futures that were both traded and delivered during 
Phase I (Phase II) of the EU ETS. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Risk premia are 
expressed in £/MWh. 
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Table 9. Regression results of realized risk premia on economic risk factors for the Nordic electricity futures 
 αi βi γi δi 𝑅!(%) Δ𝑅!(%) 
RPNOV05 0.77*** -0.17 -0.32 0.11 31.9 0.3 
RPDEC05 0.70* -0.11 -0.60* 0.05 18.3 -0.4 
RPJAN06 0.70** -0.08 -0.64** -0.05 24.8 -0.4 
RPFEB06 0.36** -0.14 0.00 0.06 11.2 -0.5 
RPMAR06 1.01*** 0.19 -0.55** -0.34** 48.3 9.1 
RPAPR06 0.62*** -0.05 -0.39** -0.60*** 28.7 15.6 
RPMAY06 -0.16 0.03 -0.10 -0.14 3.6 1.0 
RPJUN06 -0.26 -0.14 0.11 0.04 -0.1 -0.8 
RPJUL06 -0.78* -0.47*** 0.29 0.24 25.2 2.2 
RPAUG06 -0.62 -0.09 0.15 0.00 24.4 -0.6 
RPSEP06 -0.32 -0.27** 0.02 -0.18 29.0 0.5 
RPOCT06 -0.33 -0.44*** 0.10 -0.31 51.6 2.9 
RPNOV06 -0.42** -0.39*** 0.11 -0.16 53.1 0.4 
RPDEC06 0.02 -0.02 -0.16 -0.46** 27.3 8.8 
RPJAN07 0.02 0.30 -0.63** -0.34*** 40.8 9.8 
RPFEB07 0.14 0.34*** -0.71*** -0.59*** 65.5 14.5 
RPMAR07 0.24 0.14 -0.56*** -0.64*** 59.5 12.5 
RPAPR07 -0.31 -0.11 0.19 -0.47** 44.9 6.1 
RPMAY07 -0.08 -0.13 0.23 -0.59*** 36.8 18.1 
RPJUN07 -0.10 -0.57** 0.51** -0.51*** 48.8 16.7 
RPJUL07 0.47** -0.01 -0.20 -0.32** 15.8 7.6 
RPAUG07 0.08 0.20 -0.47 0.08 18.7 -0.1 
RPSEP07 -0.54** 0.06 -0.31 -0.12 64.7 0.7 
RPOCT07 -0.48** 0.11 -0.27 -0.20** 50.1 2.9 
RPNOV07 -0.89*** -0.47** 0.13 -0.05 31.6 -0.3 
RPDEC07 -1.09*** -0.21 0.30** 0.00 50.7 -0.4 
RPJUL08 0.70** 0.22 -0.58** 0.12 8.9 0.3 
RPAUG08 1.54*** -0.25*** -0.81*** 0.50*** 70.5 18.1 
RPSEP08 1.08*** -0.04 -0.82*** 0.28** 30.7 5.9 
RPOCT08 0.24 -0.14 -0.55** -0.16 15.7 1.3 
RPNOV08 0.21 -0.19** -0.70*** -0.64*** 47.4 22.8 
RPDEC08 0.39* -0.29*** -0.42*** -0.71*** 56.7 32.0 
RPJAN09 0.32*** -0.15 -0.15 -0.65*** 59.8 27.6 
RPFEB09 -0.05 -0.33* -0.18 -0.65*** 63.0 32.4 
RPMAR09 -0.37*** -0.08 -0.14 -0.68*** 68.2 40.3 
RPAPR09 -0.54*** -0.33** 0.24* -0.82*** 65.0 58.9 
RPMAY09 -0.43*** -0.42** 0.36** -0.77*** 44.3 44.7 
RPJUN09 -0.06 -0.21 0.19 -0.80*** 56.6 34.5 
RPJUL09 -0.01 0.19 -0.06 -0.76*** 68.8 25.6 
RPAUG09 0.32 0.56*** -0.58*** -0.55*** 62.8 20.1 
RPSEP09 -0.24 0.48*** 0.07 -0.51*** 38.5 16.0 
RPOCT09 0.35 0.10 -0.14 -0.44*** 16.4 14.3 
RPNOV09 0.39 0.30 -0.35 0.41*** 17.5 14.9 
RPDEC09 0.40* 0.24 -0.36 0.25* 8.8 5.3 
RPJAN10 0.47** 0.03 -0.28 0.09 8.3 -0.1 
RPFEB10 1.07*** 0.15** -0.42*** 0.06 66.8 0.0 
RPMAR10 0.71*** -0.17 0.01 -0.22* 46.3 3.7 
RPAPR10 0.81*** -0.05 -0.09 -0.25*** 49.6 3.1 
RPMAY10 0.77*** 0.02 -0.11 -0.31*** 38.9 5.8 
RPJUN10 0.24 -0.23 0.13 -0.13 10.4 0.6 
RPJUL10 0.57*** -0.14* -0.03 -0.03 32.7 -0.2 
RPAUG10 0.21 0.03 0.26 0.37** 34.8 9.0 
RPSEP10 0.54** 0.06 -0.03 0.38* 38.0 10.3 
RPOCT10 0.19 -0.19 0.26 -0.06 14.8 -0.3 
RPNOV10 0.01 0.04 0.38 -0.23 12.1 3.8 
RPDEC10 -0.04 0.03 0.30 -0.22* 6.9 2.8 
RPJAN11 0.15 0.10 0.35* -0.25** 40.1 3.5 
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Table 9 continued. 
RPFEB11 0.50** 0.35*** -0.08 -0.24** 56.7 3.8 
RPMAR11 0.80*** 0.35*** -0.22 -0.03 68.5 -0.2 
RPAPR11 0.94*** 0.25*** -0.34*** 0.29** 55.0 7.3 
RPMAY11 0.96*** 0.25* -0.81*** 0.44*** 28.6 15.6 
RPJUN11 0.69*** 0.32** -0.67** 0.58*** 33.7 28.2 
RPJUL11 -0.07 0.57*** -0.01 -0.10 31.2 0.6 
RPAUG11 -0.16 0.30** -0.18 -0.45*** 51.7 14.5 
RPSEP11 -0.50*** 0.28** 0.17 -0.41*** 69.0 12.2 
RPOCT11 -0.51** 0.38*** -0.02 -0.31*** 73.4 8.6 
RPNOV11 -0.75*** 0.35*** 0.23* -0.38*** 78.0 14.2 
RPDEC11 -0.75*** 0.34*** 0.47*** -0.36*** 47.7 12.5 
Note: The test equation is: 𝑅𝑃!" = 𝑐! + 𝛼! ∙ 𝜎!,! + 𝛽! ∙ 𝜎!,! + 𝛾! ∙ 𝜎!,! + 𝛿! ∙ 𝜎!,! + 𝜀!" where RPit is the realized risk 
premium of contract i on day t; σS,t, σL,t, σR,t and σC,t is the conditional volatility of the electricity spot price, load, 
revenues and carbon futures returns on day t, respectively. The estimations refer to one-by-one regressions of the 
risk premium for each electricity futures contract on the four risk factors. The last column (Δ𝑅!) presents the change in the adjusted R-squared coefficient (𝑅!) as compared to the case when the regressions are estimated 
without including the carbon risk factor. For comparison purposes, all variables are standardized prior to 
estimation by subtracting the mean and dividing with the standard deviation. Newey and West (1987) corrected 
standard errors are employed for the estimations. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 10. Regression results of realized risk premia on economic risk factors for the French electricity futures 
 αi βi γi δi 𝑅!(%) Δ𝑅!(%) 
RPNOV05 0.33 -0.14 -0.09 -0.55*** 18.0 19.4 
RPDEC05 0.20 -0.14 0.47 0.24 52.1 1.3 
RPJAN06 1.06*** 0.27*** -0.77*** -0.55** 69.9 9.7 
RPFEB06 1.05*** 0.38*** -0.64*** -0.05 64.7 -0.4 
RPMAR06 0.27 0.09 -0.29 -0.55** 15.5 19.6 
RPAPR06 -0.57 0.05 0.45 0.26 10.5 4.8 
RPMAY06 -0.01 -0.28*** 0.28 -0.69*** 24.8 18.8 
RPJUN06 0.31 -0.04 -0.04 -0.67*** 59.8 20.5 
RPJUL06 0.68*** 0.20 -0.28*** -0.30** 70.2 4.6 
RPAUG06 1.06*** -0.05 -0.41 -0.27** 67.0 4.8 
RPSEP06 -0.44* -0.01 0.64*** -0.71*** 24.3 21.0 
RPOCT06 0.74*** 0.04 -0.40* -0.52*** 22.1 26.4 
RPNOV06 1.04*** 0.13*** -0.68*** -0.27*** 71.5 7.3 
RPDEC06 -0.45 0.19 0.17 -0.26* 11.5 4.7 
RPJAN07 0.38*** -0.31** -0.23* -1.25** 19.3 15.7 
RPFEB07 0.22*** -0.21*** -0.08 -0.68*** 17.4 23.3 
RPMAR07 0.17 -0.15 -0.11 -0.86*** 8.4 20.3 
RPAPR07 0.38** 0.09 -0.47** -0.71*** 8.5 28.4 
RPMAY07 0.11 0.02 -0.08 -0.66*** 6.0 38.9 
RPJUN07 0.13 0.10 -0.18 -0.49*** 4.9 21.0 
RPJUL07 -0.47 0.24** 0.03 -0.10 24.5 0.2 
RPAUG07 -0.87*** 0.12* 0.46*** 0.06 43.7 -0.1 
RPSEP07 -0.60*** 0.16 0.27* 0.41*** 31.9 15.8 
RPOCT07 -0.65*** 0.19 0.37** 0.35*** 34.3 11.1 
RPNOV07 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.05 10.5 -0.5 
RPDEC07 0.83*** 0.10 -0.31 0.06 38.2 -0.2 
RPJUL08 -0.18 -0.26** 0.41 -0.56*** 19.0 26.1 
RPAUG08 0.86*** -0.02 -0.24 -0.08 47.0 0.2 
RPSEP08 1.23*** 0.18** -0.58*** -0.07 71.0 0.2 
RPOCT08 1.09*** 0.19* -0.56*** -0.04 56.4 -0.2 
RPNOV08 0.44* 0.05 -0.26 0.03 7.8 -0.7 
RPDEC08 0.43* 0.01 -0.22 -0.28** 9.9 6.8 
RPJAN09 0.63*** 0.07 -0.34*** -0.55*** 25.3 28.9 
RPFEB09 0.14 -0.16 -0.27 -0.63*** 1.1 36.6 
RPMAR09 -0.04 -0.29*** 0.07 -0.69*** 13.5 35.7 
RPAPR09 0.41 -0.02 -0.26 -0.58*** 39.3 15.9 
RPMAY09 0.21 0.05 -0.09 -0.56*** 20.9 20.7 
RPJUN09 0.31 0.00 -0.05 -0.39*** 22.4 8.8 
RPJUL09 0.83*** 0.15 -0.28 -0.11* 48.5 0.5 
RPAUG09 0.82*** 0.04 -0.66** -0.10 31.0 0.2 
RPSEP09 0.37** 0.08 -0.15 -0.56*** 11.9 30.4 
RPOCT09 0.46* 0.18 -0.03 -0.31 43.6 5.2 
RPNOV09 -0.17 0.03 0.59 0.49*** -0.4 14.1 
RPDEC09 -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.12 -3.9 -0.4 
RPJAN10 0.99*** 0.13 -0.45** -0.14 4.3 1.3 
RPFEB10 -0.19 0.08 -0.11 -0.52*** 15.4 19.8 
RPMAR10 -1.06*** -0.05 0.45* 0.06 57.9 -0.6 
RPAPR10 -0.36 0.13 0.28 0.50* 25.7 8.8 
RPMAY10 -0.92*** -0.12 0.12 0.36 37.9 6.9 
RPJUN10 -0.60*** -0.22*** 0.23*** 0.61*** 62.5 28.7 
RPJUL10 -0.46** -0.40** 0.45* 0.44*** 29.4 13.7 
RPAUG10 -0.72*** -0.25 0.68** -0.62*** 4.6 33.6 
RPSEP10 -0.12 -0.54 0.76 -0.25 3.5 3.3 
RPOCT10 0.83** 0.54 -0.98 -0.37 4.3 4.3 
RPNOV10 0.98*** 0.24*** -0.21*** 0.13** 89.0 0.8 
RPDEC10 1.21*** 0.12 -0.60*** 0.11 80.1 0.9 
RPJAN11 0.87* -0.24 -0.66 -0.32* 24.9 5.2 
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Table 10 continued. 
RPFEB11 1.01*** 0.17** -0.19 0.11 68.4 0.1 
RPMAR11 0.52** 0.33*** 0.06 -0.08 46.5 -0.3 
RPAPR11 -0.13 0.00 0.03 -0.78*** 5.7 58.9 
RPMAY11 -0.60*** 0.05 0.28** 0.69*** 30.7 44.6 
RPJUN11 -0.61*** -0.03 0.29** 0.46*** 22.4 20.6 
RPJUL11 0.22 -0.01 -0.32** -0.75*** 7.5 55.5 
RPAUG11 -0.11 0.18 -0.06 -0.71*** 18.0 25.6 
RPSEP11 -0.34 -0.04 0.43* -0.65*** 8.4 36.3 
RPOCT11 -0.78*** -0.13 0.75*** -0.35* 17.6 11.0 
RPNOV11 -0.90*** -0.09 0.44 0.28 34.0 5.7 
RPDEC11 -0.66*** -0.20 0.81*** -0.58*** 29.2 30.9 
Note: The test equation is: 𝑅𝑃!" = 𝑐! + 𝛼! ∙ 𝜎!,! + 𝛽! ∙ 𝜎!,! + 𝛾! ∙ 𝜎!,! + 𝛿! ∙ 𝜎!,! + 𝜀!" where RPit is the realized risk 
premium of contract i on day t; σS,t, σL,t, σR,t and σC,t is the conditional volatility of the electricity spot price, load, 
revenues and carbon futures returns on day t, respectively. The estimations refer to one-by-one regressions of the 
risk premium for each electricity futures contract on the four risk factors. The last column (Δ𝑅!) presents the change in the adjusted R-squared coefficient (𝑅!) as compared to the case when the regressions are estimated 
without including the carbon risk factor. For comparison purposes, all variables are standardized prior to 
estimation by subtracting the mean and dividing with the standard deviation. Newey and West (1987) corrected 
standard errors are employed for the estimations. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 11. Regression results of realized risk premia on economic risk factors for the British electricity futures 
 αi βi γi δi 𝑅!(%) Δ𝑅!(%) 
RPNOV05 -0.11 -0.02 0.31 0.64*** 8.3 15.0 
RPDEC05 0.12 -0.16 0.42 0.34** 28.2 6.6 
RPJAN06 0.53** -0.11 0.12 0.16 41.6 1.5 
RPFEB06 -0.09 -0.19* 0.59*** 0.34** 15.3 10.0 
RPMAR06 -0.03 -0.15 0.43** 0.35** 9.4 10.8 
RPAPR06 0.52*** -0.03 0.07 0.17** 29.7 2.3 
RPMAY06 0.63*** -0.03 -0.13 0.09 26.0 0.5 
RPJUN06 0.68*** 0.01 -0.26** -0.38*** 33.7 13.8 
RPJUL06 0.63*** 0.07 -0.33** -0.30** 24.5 7.9 
RPAUG06 0.91*** 0.17** -0.55*** -0.18 36.6 2.6 
RPSEP06 0.28 0.20** -0.19 -0.25** 7.2 5.2 
RPOCT06 0.52** 0.21** -0.17 0.21*** 14.6 3.3 
RPNOV06 0.65*** 0.24*** -0.26 0.46*** 14.4 17.4 
RPDEC06 0.60** 0.25*** -0.27 0.35*** 11.7 9.3 
RPJAN07 0.59*** 0.23*** -0.27* 0.25*** 13.0 4.5 
RPFEB07 0.36** -0.09 -0.13 0.09 5.1 0.3 
RPMAR07 0.40*** 0.02 -0.23* -0.12 8.9 0.8 
RPAPR07 0.38*** 0.06 -0.30** -0.23 10.5 4.0 
RPMAY07 0.21 -0.03 -0.13 -0.33 6.1 8.6 
RPJUN07 0.17 -0.10 -0.02 -0.70*** 16.8 23.1 
RPJUL07 0.42*** -0.06 -0.27** -0.67*** 24.2 20.4 
RPAUG07 0.28* -0.01 -0.30** -0.71*** 17.4 35.7 
RPSEP07 -0.21* -0.08 0.03 -0.72*** 6.2 31.9 
RPOCT07 -0.35*** -0.14 0.08 -0.53*** 9.0 27.6 
RPNOV07 0.05 -0.06 0.09 -0.21 -0.5 3.7 
RPDEC07 0.69*** 0.17** -0.27 -0.03 22.6 -0.3 
RPJUL08 -0.01 -0.27** 0.40 -0.47*** 24.9 18.2 
RPAUG08 0.10 -0.34*** 0.43 -0.11 24.8 0.7 
RPSEP08 0.21 -0.35*** 0.37 -0.07 29.9 0.0 
RPOCT08 0.11 -0.32** 0.42* -0.09 25.4 0.4 
RPNOV08 0.26 -0.25* 0.30 0.08 30.0 0.3 
RPDEC08 0.29 -0.24 0.24 0.02 27.5 -0.3 
RPJAN09 0.31 -0.24 0.18 -0.21* 22.8 4.0 
RPFEB09 0.75*** -0.06 -0.31* -0.51*** 20.1 23.4 
RPMAR09 0.48*** -0.09 -0.18 -0.66*** 7.7 41.3 
RPAPR09 0.26** -0.11 -0.12 -0.75*** 11.4 52.3 
RPMAY09 0.20* 0.13** -0.07 -0.73*** 22.3 43.5 
RPJUN09 0.21 -0.15* -0.12 -0.68*** 29.5 30.9 
RPJUL09 0.38** -0.10 -0.20 -0.47*** 25.9 16.0 
RPAUG09 0.66*** 0.04 -0.31** -0.23* 31.9 4.0 
RPSEP09 0.82*** 0.26* -0.35** 0.20** 33.1 3.5 
RPOCT09 0.91*** 0.08 -0.43*** 0.30*** 31.8 8.3 
RPNOV09 0.72*** 0.17* -0.37** 0.34*** 19.7 11.1 
RPDEC09 0.69*** 0.16 -0.26** 0.43*** 22.3 18.3 
RPJAN10 0.78*** 0.19* -0.27** 0.43*** 34.6 18.0 
RPFEB10 0.48** 0.03 -0.34* 0.49*** 7.7 23.5 
RPMAR10 0.22 -0.07 -0.02 0.51*** 2.0 26.1 
RPAPR10 0.30 -0.12 -0.03 0.50*** 7.7 24.6 
RPMAY10 0.33 -0.17* 0.02 0.31*** 19.0 8.4 
RPJUN10 0.05 -0.27*** 0.22 0.24* 11.1 5.1 
RPJUL10 -0.45*** -0.34*** 0.46*** 0.00 10.5 -0.4 
RPAUG10 -0.47*** -0.12 0.46*** -0.10 7.2 0.6 
RPSEP10 -0.69*** -0.17 0.55*** -0.04 18.1 -0.3 
RPOCT10 -0.06 -0.14 0.21 0.27** 5.6 5.5 
RPNOV10 -0.42** -0.18 0.44** 0.08 5.5 0.0 
RPDEC10 -0.68*** -0.19 0.55*** 0.10 13.4 0.3 
RPJAN11 -0.33 -0.11 0.67*** -0.24* 13.1 5.1 
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Table 11 continued. 
RPFEB11 -0.04 -0.09 0.49*** -0.15 19.8 1.8 
RPMAR11 0.38*** -0.10 0.11 0.10* 18.7 0.6 
RPAPR11 0.46*** -0.08 -0.12 0.00 12.6 -0.4 
RPMAY11 0.36*** -0.04 -0.14 -0.01 5.9 -0.4 
RPJUN11 0.18 -0.07 0.01 0.04 2.0 -0.2 
RPJUL11 0.10 -0.06 0.00 0.09 -0.4 0.3 
RPAUG11 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.12 0.1 1.0 
RPSEP11 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.11 -0.4 0.6 
RPOCT11 -0.07 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.5 0.7 
RPNOV11 -0.07 0.08 0.05 0.38*** 0.3 12.8 
RPDEC11 -0.07 0.05 0.05 0.47*** 1.0 20.4 
Note: The test equation is: 𝑅𝑃!" = 𝑐! + 𝛼! ∙ 𝜎!,! + 𝛽! ∙ 𝜎!,! + 𝛾! ∙ 𝜎!,! + 𝛿! ∙ 𝜎!,! + 𝜀!" where RPit is the realized risk 
premium of contract i on day t; σS,t, σL,t, σR,t and σC,t is the conditional volatility of the electricity spot price, load, 
revenues and carbon futures returns on day t, respectively. The estimations refer to one-by-one regressions of the 
risk premium for each electricity futures contract on the four risk factors. The last column (Δ𝑅!) presents the change in the adjusted R-squared coefficient (𝑅!) as compared to the case when the regressions are estimated 
without including the carbon risk factor. For comparison purposes, all variables are standardized prior to 
estimation by subtracting the mean and dividing with the standard deviation. Newey and West (1987) corrected 
standard errors are employed for the estimations. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Electricity spot prices in the Nordic (top), French (middle) and British power market (bottom) 
 
 
 
Note: The period covered is from 03/05/2005 to 31/12/2011. Electricity prices in both the Nordic and French 
market are quoted in €/MWh, while in the British in £/MWh. 
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Figure 2. Electricity futures curve for the Nordic (top), French (middle) and British contracts (bottom) 
 
 
 
Note: The figure displays the average price of the monthly electricity futures traded from 03/05/2005 to 31/12/2011 for the 
delivery months November 2005 to December 2007 (Phase I of the EU ETS) and July 2008 to December 2011 (Phase II). 
The contracts with delivery in the months January to June 2008 are excluded from the analysis because their trading (or 
part of it) and maturity took place in different EU ETS phases. Electricity prices for both the Nordic and French futures are 
quoted in €/MWh, while for the British contracts in £/MWh. 
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Figure 3. Electricity load in the Nordic (top), French (middle) and British power market (bottom) 
 
 
Note: The period covered is from 03/05/2005 to 31/12/2011. Electricity load is quoted in GWh. 
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Figure 4. Carbon futures prices (top) and logarithmic returns (bottom) 
	  
	  
Note: The period covered is from 03/05/2005 to 31/12/2011. Phase I of the EU ETS ended in December 2007. The 
figure depicts the prices (top) and logarithmic returns (bottom) of a rolled-over EUA futures series constructed 
using the contracts traded in NYSE ICE with December 2006 and December 2007 (2008 and 2011) expiries for 
Phase I (Phase II) of the EU ETS. Carbon futures prices are quoted in €/EUA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0"
5"
10"
15"
20"
25"
30"
35"
M
ay
*0
5"
Ju
l*0
5"
Se
p*
05
"
N
ov
*0
5"
Ja
n*
06
"
M
ar
*0
6"
M
ay
*0
6"
Ju
l*0
6"
Se
p*
06
"
N
ov
*0
6"
Ja
n*
07
"
M
ar
*0
7"
M
ay
*0
7"
Ju
l*0
7"
Se
p*
07
"
N
ov
*0
7"
Ja
n*
08
"
M
ar
*0
8"
M
ay
*0
8"
Ju
l*0
8"
Se
p*
08
"
N
ov
*0
8"
Ja
n*
09
"
M
ar
*0
9"
M
ay
*0
9"
Ju
l*0
9"
Se
p*
09
"
N
ov
*0
9"
Ja
n*
10
"
M
ar
*1
0"
M
ay
*1
0"
Ju
l*1
0"
Se
p*
10
"
N
ov
*1
0"
Ja
n*
11
"
M
ar
*1
1"
M
ay
*1
1"
Ju
l*1
1"
Se
p*
11
"
N
ov
*1
1"
!0.6%
!0.4%
!0.2%
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
M
ay
!0
5%
Ju
l!0
5%
Se
p!
05
%
N
ov
!0
5%
Ja
n!
06
%
M
ar
!0
6%
M
ay
!0
6%
Ju
l!0
6%
Se
p!
06
%
N
ov
!0
6%
Ja
n!
07
%
M
ar
!0
7%
M
ay
!0
7%
Ju
l!0
7%
Se
p!
07
%
N
ov
!0
7%
Ja
n!
08
%
M
ar
!0
8%
M
ay
!0
8%
Ju
l!0
8%
Se
p!
08
%
N
ov
!0
8%
Ja
n!
09
%
M
ar
!0
9%
M
ay
!0
9%
Ju
l!0
9%
Se
p!
09
%
N
ov
!0
9%
Ja
n!
10
%
M
ar
!1
0%
M
ay
!1
0%
Ju
l!1
0%
Se
p!
10
%
N
ov
!1
0%
Ja
n!
11
%
M
ar
!1
1%
M
ay
!1
1%
Ju
l!1
1%
Se
p!
11
%
N
ov
!1
1%
47	  
	  
Figure 5. Realized risk premia for the Nordic (top), French (middle) and British electricity futures (bottom) 
 
 
 
Note: The figure displays the mean of the realized risk premia of the electricity futures traded between 03/05/2005 to 
31/12/2011 for the delivery months November 2005 to December 2007 (Phase I of the EU ETS) and July 2008 to December 
2011 (Phase II). The risk premia for the electricity contracts with delivery in the months January to June 2008 are excluded 
from the analysis because the trading of these futures (or part of it) and maturity took place in different EU ETS phases. 
Risk premia for both the Nordic and French futures are expressed in €/MWh, while for the British contacts in £/MWh. 
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